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My dissertation is composed by three essays with ex-post evaluations of public policies 
adopted in a major country of the developing world: Brazil.  In each essay, I have tried to identify 
the main outcomes of the evaluated policies using quantitative econometric methods.  Ultimately, 
the objective of these studies is to contribute to the policy debate by providing a credible evidence 
of policy outcomes and limitations. 
My first chapter investigates how fare-free public transportation for the elderly affects the 
travel behavior and well-being of policy beneficiaries in major Brazilian metro areas. The second 
essay of my thesis analyzes how a series of changes in urban speed limits affected road accidents 
and travel time in São Paulo, Brazilian largest city. Last, my third chapter studies the expansion of 
affirmative action policies in Brazilian Federal universities, measuring how the adoption of these 
policies have changed the enrolment of students from targeted underprivileged groups. 
In each of these essays, I provide novel evidence about the impacts of the evaluated 
policies.  On my first chapter I present evidence that the speed limit reductions adopted in São 
Paulo have had a substantial impact on road accident reduction, and the welfare benefits associated 
with this outcome largely outweighs the welfare costs imposed by the policy restrictions due to 
longer travel times.  The second chapter shows that the adoption of affirmative action by Brazilian 
universities increased the enrollment of underprivileged students, however, while race-conscious 
policies led to the enrollment of more Black students, race-blind affirmative action had no 
significant impacts on the enrollment of racial minorities.  The third chapter shows that the policy 
of fare-free public transportation has a very limited effect on the use of private vehicles by 
beneficiaries, so a price incentive to public transportation may not be an effective tool for reducing 
car-related externalities. 
Next, I present the individual abstracts for each of my thesis chapters:  
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Chapter 1: Assessing the Impacts of Speed Limit Changes in a Metropolitan Area of the 
Developing World 
This paper assesses the outcomes of a set of policies that changed traffic speed limits in a 
major city of the developing world.  We analyze policy impacts using data about traffic accidents, 
real time congestion scrapped from a web API, and traffic monitoring cameras.  By exploring the 
temporal and spatial heterogeneity of policy adoption, we estimate its impacts on road accidents, 
traffic volume and commuting time.  Our results indicate that speed limit reductions led to a large 
decrease of accidents on treated road segments while not affecting traffic volume.  However, we 
also found that speed limit increases on major urban highways reduced the travel time on those 
roads.  We then compared the social costs and benefits of a speed limit reduction.  We calculate 
that the welfare gains associated with the reduction in road accidents are at least 46% larger than 
the welfare losses due to longer commuting times.  Moreover, while the losses in commuting time 
are increasing with wealth, the benefits of accident reductions are proportionally larger for middle- 
and lower income individuals, thus indicating that a speed limit reduction have a progressive 
welfare impact in the setting evaluated in our study. 
Chapter 2: Affirmative Action in Brazilian Universities: Effects on the Enrollment of 
Targeted Groups 
This paper investigates how the adoption of affirmative action for college admission 
affected the enrollment of students from socioeconomically disadvantaged groups in Brazil.  We 
explore the time heterogeneity of policy adoption by Brazilian universities to identify the policy 
effects while accounting for time confounding unobservables.  Our analysis indicate that the 
adoption of affirmative action policies led to an increase in the enrollment of students from groups 
explicitly targeted by each policy, particularly public high-school students and Blacks.    As for 
the heterogeneities of policy impacts, larger effects were observed for more competitive and more 
prestigious academic programs.  Lastly, we found that universities that adopted affirmative action 
policies with explicit racial criteria experienced an increase in the enrollment of Black students; 
meanwhile, universities that adopted race-blind policies had no significant changes in the racial 
profile of their admitted students. 
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Chapter 3: Travel Behavior Effects of Fare-Free Public Transportation for the Elderly in 
Brazilian Metropolitan Areas 
This paper investigates how a policy that grants fare-free public transportation for the 
elderly affects the travel behavior of its beneficiaries.  To identify the policy impacts, I explore the 
fact that eligibility for exemption is based on age thresholds that vary by gender and by city.  Using 
data from household travel surveys, I estimate the causal effects of free-fare on travel behavior 
through a Regression Discontinuity Design.  The results of my analysis indicate that eligibility for 
fare-free public transportation increases transit ridership among beneficiaries in approximately 
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Chapter 1: Assessing the Impacts of Speed 
Limit Changes in a Metropolitan Area of 
the Developing World 
With Amanda Ang and Peter Christensen 
This paper assesses the outcomes of a set of policies that changed traffic 
speed limits in a major city of the developing world.  We analyze policy 
impacts using data about traffic accidents, real time congestion scrapped 
from a web API, and traffic monitoring cameras.  By exploring the temporal 
and spatial heterogeneity of policy adoption, we estimate its impacts on 
road accidents, traffic volume and commuting time.  Our results indicate 
that speed limit reductions led to a large decrease of accidents on treated 
road segments while not affecting traffic volume.  However, we also found 
that speed limit increases on major urban highways reduced the travel time 
on those roads.  We then compared the social costs and benefits of a speed 
limit reduction.  We calculate that the welfare gains associated with the 
reduction in road accidents are at least 46% larger than the welfare losses 
due to longer commuting times.  Moreover, while the losses in commuting 
time are increasing with wealth, the benefits of accident reductions are 
proportionally larger for middle- and lower income individuals, thus 
indicating that a speed limit reduction have a progressive welfare impact in 
the setting evaluated in our study. 
Keywords: Speed Limit Changes, Road Accidents, Travel Time 
Traffic accidents represent an astonishing cost to societies.  Road injuries are the leading cause of 
unnatural deaths worldwide, with approximately 1.3 million fatalities per year, or 27.1% of all 
human unnatural deaths (WHO, 2015).  Lack of road safety is particularly problematic in the 
developing world.  Although low- and middle-income countries account for only half of world 
vehicles, 90% of road fatalities occur in those countries.  Meanwhile, it is well established in the 
transportation literature that vehicle speed is strongly associated with the probability and severity 
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of road accidents (Archer, Fotheringham, Symmons, & Corben, 2008), (Elvik, 2013). Therefore, 
speed limit regulations are adopted throughout the world, and in recent years, several major cities 
have been experimenting with stricter speed restrictions in urban roads.1  However, lower speed 
limits may pose an important welfare cost to societies as commuters may face longer journeys.   
Ultimately, due to the complexity of urban transportation systems, weighting the costs and benefits 
of stricter speed regulations within cities is an empirical question which has not been fully 
addressed yet. 
Within this context, this paper investigates the outcomes of a series of policies that altered 
speed limits in a major city of the developing world, namely São Paulo, Brazil.  In 2015, the city 
government enacted a policy program reducing the speed limits in the city highways (Marginais) 
and arterial roads.  However, in 2017 the speed limit of urban highways was reverted to pre-
reduction levels.  We explore the time heterogeneity of these changes to identify the policy impacts 
using combined datasets of traffic accidents, traffic cameras, and real-time congestion scrapped 
from a web API. 
Our results indicate that the 2015 speed limit reductions decreased road accidents in about 
a third on treated road segments.  Meanwhile, after the 2017 speed limit increase, travel speed on 
treated highways increased by about 6%, although effects were concentrated in off-peak hours.  
Given these results, we compare speed limit changes welfare costs and benefits.  Using standard 
parameters from the literature for the value of time and the value of statistical life, we find that, in 
the case of speed limit reductions, the welfare gains associated with fewer accidents outweigh the 
welfare losses due to longer commuting by approximately 1.46 times.  Finally, we explored the 
distribution of policy costs and benefits along distinct segments of society.  We identified that 
while welfare losses due to travel time were larger for wealthier individuals, the benefits of 
accident reductions were concentrated on lower- and middle-income people. 
Other empirical studies have evaluated the impacts of speed limit changes, for example 
(van Benthem, 2015) and (Ashenfelter & Greenstone, 2004), which analyzed the impacts of speed 
limit increases on American highways in the 1980s and 1990s.  Our paper extends beyond these 
                                                 
1 Examples include the cities of New York, Boston, London, Paris and Stockholm (Archer, Fotheringham, Symmons, & Corben, 2008),  
3 
 
studies as we analyze the effects of speed limit changes within an urban setting, where more than 
two thirds of total vehicle miles take place (FHA, 2016).  Moreover, we analyze a metropolitan 
area of the developing world where road accidents and fatalities are a more prevalent problem.  
Finally, due to the richness of our data, we were able to explore the distributive impacts of speed 
limit changes, an aspect of this problem not yet explored in the literature. 
With respect to our analysis of policy impacts on travel time, our study has the novelty of 
combining a citywide sample of representative trips with a web routing service that collects real 
time congestion information.  By simulating the set of representative trips before and after a speed 
limit change, we were to identify in a finer scale the distribution of policy impacts on individuals.  
While other studies have already used real-time web routing services to evaluate the impact of 
urban transportation policies  (Hanna, Kreindler, & Olken, 2017), to the extent of our knowledge, 
none have yet combined this approach with a representative sample of commuters to investigate 
the distribution of policy impacts throughout the society. 
We are aware of at least one other study (Jardim, 2017) which had investigated the impacts 
of the São Paulo speed limit reductions on speed and road accidents.  Our paper differs from that 
study as we investigate a larger set of roads,2 use real time and daily measures of traffic speed and 
combine the reduced form results with a representative sample of the population to investigate the 
distributive impacts of the policy. 
The remaining of this paper is divided as follows: Session 1 describes the background of 
the speed limit changes investigated in our study. Session 2 details the datasets used for our 
analysis, and Session 3 presents the empirical strategies used to identify the policy impacts on 
accidents and travel time. On Session 4, we compare the costs and benefits of the policies, 
including our distributive analysis. Session 5 compares our results with the literature and Session 
6 concludes. 
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, the reduced form results of speed limit effects on accidents from Jardim (2017) are of similar magnitude as ours. 
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1.1    Background 
With more than 20 million residents, São Paulo is one of the largest metropolitan areas in 
the world.  The city is characterized by high urban density, limited transportation infrastructure, 
and high spatial concentration of the economic activity (LSE - Urban Age Programme, 2009).  
Every day, approximately 30 million motorized trips are made in São Paulo, out of which about 
half are made by public transportation and half by private modes (METRO, 2013).  All these 
factors combined cause the city of São Paulo to be one of the most heavily congested urban areas 
in the world.  Table 1.1 presents some figures about the overall characteristics of motorized trips 
made in São Paulo on a regular weekday. 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Characteristics of Motorized Trips 
Made in a Regular Weekday in São Paulo 
 
1.1.1    Speed Limit Reductions in 2015 
From 2005 to 2014, there were on average 2,500 road deaths per year in the Metropolitan 
Area of São Paulo.  This amount corresponds to a ratio of 12.5 deaths per 100,000 residents 
(DATASUS, 2018), and is 56.2% higher than OECD average.  Given these figures, the government 











29.74 1.00 7.99 50.53
By mode
Bus 11.78 0.40 6.83 58.73
Rail 4.36 0.15 16.61 88.56
Car 12.49 0.42 6.02 31.46
Motorcycle 1.04 0.03 8.50 27.86
By motivation
Work 16.81 0.57 9.88 60.25
Education 7.51 0.25 4.73 35.72
Other 5.43 0.18 6.90 43.14
Motorized trips




establishing the goal of reducing road mortality in the city to 6 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants by 
2020 (CET, 2016).  As part of the measures adopted for this project, the city implemented in 2015 
a policy program reducing the speed limit in several major urban roads throughout the city.  The 
program had two major phases.  First in July 20, 2015, the speed limit of the main urban highways 
of the city (Marginais3) was reduced from 90km/h to 70km/h.4  Then, in the following six months, 
the speed limit in the city arterial roads was reduced from 60km/h to 50km/h5 (CET, 2016).  By 
the end of this process, approximately 570 km of roads had their speed limit reduced.6  Although 
these segments correspond to only 4% of the São Paulo road network, they account for about 29% 
of private vehicles VMT in the city.7  Figure 1.1 maps the roads where speed limits were reduced, 
indicating the final speed limit in each treated road segment after the 2015 changes. 
As shown in Figure 1.2, the implementation of lower speed limits was evenly distributed 
throughout the second semester of 2015. The figure plots the cumulative length of roads which 
were treated during the period, showing that the total length of treated segments increase almost 
constantly. 
Moreover, besides the speed limit reductions, another major action of the road safety 
program was the expansion of speeding enforcement through the installation and upgrade of speed 
control cameras8 (CET, 2016).  Figure 1.3 plots the evolution in the number of speed control 
cameras in São Paulo between 2015 and 2016.  The total number of cameras went from 381 in the 
beginning of 2015 to 698 by the end of that year, an increase of about 83%. 
                                                 
3 The name “Marginais” comes from the location of these highways, which run through the banks (margens in Portuguese) of the Pinheiros and 
Tietê rivers. 
4 These values correspond to the speed limit reduction in the express lanes of the Marginais.  In the intermediary and local lanes of the highways, 
speed limit was reduced respectively from 70km/h to 60km/h and from 70km/h to 50km/h. 
5 The only exceptions were the “Corredor Norte-Sul” (North-South Corridor), where the speed limit was reduced from 70km/h to 60km/h, and a 
few arterial roads where the speed limit was reduced to 40km/h. 
6 This figure does not weight the treated segment by their corresponding number of lanes. 
7 These figures were calculated by the authors by overlapping the simulated paths of trips reported in the 2012 Mobility Survey over the ci ty’s 
road network. VMT = Vehicle Miles Traveled. 
8 In Brazil, the main mechanism of speed limit enforcement are automated traffic c ameras that register vehicle speed and issue speeding tickets 
to vehicles that are speeding.  The fees for speed limit violations are defined by the National Traffic Code (Código de Trânsito Brasileiro). In 2015 
the values for speeding were: a) R$85.13 for speeding up to 20% above the speed limit, b) R$127.69 if 20%-50% above the limit, c) R$574.63 if 




Figure 1.1: Road Segments with Speed Limit 
Reductions in 2015 by New Speed Limit 
 
Figure 1.2: Cumulative Length of Road Segments with 




Figure 1.3: Number of Speed Control Cameras in  
São Paulo by Month (Jan/2015-Sep/2017) 
Most of these new cameras were installed in the exact same road segments which had the 
speed limit reduced.  Table 1.2 compares the location of cameras installed before and after the first 
speed limit reduction implemented on July 20, 2015, and Figure 1.4 maps the location of the new 
cameras installed after that same date.  While 54% of cameras installed before July 20, 2015 were 
located on the road segments which would have the speed limit reduced, that share increased to 
70% in the case of cameras installed after that date.  Therefore, it is important to notice that along 
with the speed limit reduction, there was a concomitant expansion of speed limit enforcement, 
particularly on the roads where speed limit reduction was implemented. 
1.1.2    Marginais Speed Limit Reversal in 2017 
In January 2017, the speed limit in the Marginais was reverted to pre-2015 values, that is, 
it was raised back from 70 km/h to 90 km/h.  This measure was adopted in the first month of the 
newly elected mayor term, and it was a major campaign proposal of the winning candidate during 




Table 1.2: Speed Control Cameras in São Paulo by Date 




Figure 1.4: Speed Control Cameras Installed after July 20, 2015 
and Road Segments with Speed Limit Reductions 
cameras share cameras share
Treatment Group 434 0.54 210 0.70





Notes: Information about cameras and their location were extracted from the
website Painel Mobilidade Segura (mobilidadesegura.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/)
maintained by the São Paulo City Government. Road segments are defined as
“Treatment Group” if they had their speed limit reduced in 2015 and “Other
Roads” if no speed limit change occurred in that year.
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political campaign, with candidates defending distinct policies on the matter.9  However, contrarily 
to the speed reduction that took place in 2015, the speed limit reversal of 2017 was restricted to 
the Marginais, that is, the main urban highways of São Paulo.  Meanwhile, the speed limit in the 
city arterial roads was not re-altered.  Noteworthily, concomitant with the speed limit reversal of 
2017, some compensating safety measure were adopted to attenuate the possible increase in 
accidents risk. 10 
Summing up the timeline of policies: throughout the second semester of 2015, the speed 
limits on urban highways and arterial roads were reduced due to a policy program aimed to reduce 
road accidents.  In January of 2017, the reduction of 2015 was reverted on the main urban highways 
of the city.  In the next session, we describe the datasets we use to evaluate the impacts of these 
policy changes. 
1.2    Data 
The main goal of this study is to assess the impacts of the speed limit changes adopted in 
the roads of São Paulo which were described in the previous session. While the speed limit 
reductions were aimed to decrease road accidents, the speed limit reversal was defended during 
the city electoral campaign as a measure to reduce commuting time.  Therefore, we focus our 
analysis on these two outcomes, i.e., road accidents and commuting time.  To estimate the policy 
impacts on these variables, we explore the following datasets: 
a) Road segments with speed limit changes (2015 & 2017) 
b) Traffic accidents (2012-2016) 
c) Traffic control cameras and tickets (2014-2017) 
d) Trip simulations scraped from a Web API (2016-2017) 
                                                 
9 Some examples of the debate duri ng the electoral campaign can be found at https://goo.gl/Ju38zV, https://goo.gl/LRFWsA and 
https://goo.gl/bXW82N. 
10   These measures included: the construction of elevated road steps on pedestrian crossing points at Marginais feeding lanes; placement of signs 
warning drivers about the presence of pedestrians; bus operators were instructed to provide additional safety courses to bus drivers; traffic 
agents with speed control pistols were placed throughout the Marginais (CET, 2016). 
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Next, we describe in further details each of these datasets and how we use them in our 
analyses.  In the end of this session, we present a timeline that summarizes the policy changes 
evaluated in this paper and how our datasets overlap with them. 
1.2.1    Road Segments with Speed Limit Changes 
During the period when speed limit reductions were implemented in 2015, the traffic 
agency of São Paulo (CET) posted into its website a series of announcements indicating details 
about each upcoming speed limit changes.  In these announcements, they described the exact road 
segments which would have the speed limit reduced and the date when the change would be 
implemented.  These announcements also described the existing speed limit of these segments and 
the new limits that would be adopted.11 
We collected all such reports from the agency website, and using their information, we 
geocoded the road segments where speed limit was altered, also associating the date when the new 
speed limit was adopted in each segment.  On total, the 37 reports used in our study described the 
speed limit changes implemented on 202 different streets in São Paulo, and included 
approximately 570 km of treated road segments.  Moreover, it is important to notice that before 
the actual speed limit reduction in each segment, the traffic agency of São Paulo would place a 
series of traffic signs and banners in those segments indicating the upcoming speed limit change.12  
This fact is important for our analysis because the simple presence of these signs could already 
have some effect on drivers’ behavior.  
1.2.2    Traffic Accidents 
To evaluate the evolution of road accidents on treated segments, we analyze data from the 
São Paulo Traffic Agency yearly reports of road accidents from 2012 to 2016.  These reports 
compile information for all road accidents registered within the city of São Paulo by the police 
                                                 
11 Appendix A shows the information from one of these announcements and summary information for all  37 announcements used in thi s study. 
12 Appendix B shows an example of such signs. 
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departments, traffic agents’, hospitals, and morgues (CET, 2017).13  For each accident in these 
datasets we have: its location, time, number of victims, vehicles involved, the severity of injuries 
for each victim (unharmed, injured, dead), the alcohol level of drivers, victims age, gender and 
education attainment, and the type of vehicles involved in the accident (car, van, motorcycle, etc.).  
Table 1.3 presents some descriptive statistics of the accidents included in our dataset.  
Moreover, we calculate the monetary cost of accidents using two sets of parameters.  First, 
for vehicle costs and non-fatal victim’s cost we use the parameters estimated by IPEA (2015).  
This study from the Brazilian Institute of Economic Research estimates the average cost of road 
accidents in Brazil by accident severity and status of victims.  14   Second, in the case of road 
fatalities, we use the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) of U$ 1.695 Million15 estimated for Brazil by 
Viscusi & Masterman (2017).  Given these parameters, Table 1.4 reports the descriptive statistics 
of the monetary costs of accidents included in our sample. 
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Traffic Accidents in São Paulo (2012-2016) 
 
 
                                                 
13 We requested access to the individual accidents data from these reports using the Brazil ian Law of Access to Information ( Lei de Acesso à 
Informação).  The requests for our project were registered as LAI reques t 21,151 opened in March 31, 2017 and LAI request 25,968 opened in 
November 1, 2017.  As of the date of the latest version of this working paper, the report for 2017 have not yet been released . 
14 Appendix C presents all  the parameters from Carvalho et al (2015) used in our study. 
15 In USD of 2015. 
Total 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
São Paulo
Accidents 97,712 22,413 21,082 20,859 18,817 14,541
Injured Victims 114,527 26,933 24,875 24,381 21,656 16,682
Fatalities 4,127 907 822 938 780 680
Marginais a
Accidents 3,026 633 639 767 613 374
Injured Victims 3,581 744 775 915 696 451
Fatalities 167 34 33 46 36 18
Notes: data from the São Paulo Traffic Agency (CET) reports of road accients. a Accidents in 
the Marginais include all data geocoded within 100m of the Marginais shapefile.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics of Traffic Accident Costs in São Paulo 
 
1.2.3    Electronic Traffic Tickets and Cameras 
Unfortunately, there does not exist any readily available panel database of traffic volume 
per street in São Paulo.  Therefore, to investigate the policy impacts on traffic volume, we explore 
data from the city automated traffic ticketing cameras.  These devices automatically identify traffic 
violations issuing tickets that are mailed to the drivers’ residences and are the main form of traffic 
enforcement in the City.  The city government of São Paulo maintains a website called Painel 
Mobilidade Segura,16 where data from these tickets is compiled.  Available data about each ticket 
includes: the type of traffic violation that was registered, the date and hour of its occurrence, and 
its location.  Table 1.5 summarizes the traffic tickets data we downloaded from the website.  It 
corresponds to all electronic tickets issued in São Paulo between 2014 and September of 2017. 
                                                 
16 “Safe mobility panel” in a direct translation from Portuguese. 
Total 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
São Paulo
Total Cost
  (BRL million)a
30,119.0 6,788.4 6,197.7 6,711.3 5,694.0 4,727.5
Average Cost per Accident
  (BRL million)
0.308 0.303 0.294 0.322 0.303 0.325
Marginais b
Total Cost
  (BRL million)
1,129.1 232.8 230.1 304.7 235.1 126.4
Average Cost per Accident
  (BRL million)
0.376 0.368 0.362 0.400 0.388 0.343
Notes: accident counts and accident characteristics were extracted from the datasets of the São Paulo Traffic Agency
(CET) reports of road accients. Accident costs were calculated using the components estimated by Carvalho et al.
(2015). In the case of road fatalities, the Value of Statistical Life of USD 1.69 Million estimated by Viscusi &
Masterman (2017) for Brazil was used. a All values are presented in BRL December 2016 equivalents using the IPCA-
IBGE inflation index. 1 BRL in December 2016 was equivalent to 0.31 USD. bAccidents in the Marginais include all
data geocoded within 100m of the Marginais shapefile. 
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Electronic Driving Tickets issued in São Paulo 
(Jan/2014 – Sep/2017) 
 
We use this dataset to construct a proxy of road usage over time.  Specifically, we explore 
the number of driving restriction17 tickets issued per road segment per day.  To construct this 
proxy, we have to assume that, given a number of cameras, the number of driving restriction 
violations should be a direct function of the number of cars circulating on monitored road segments 
during restricted hours.18 
 
                                                 
17 São Paulo adopts a driving restriction scheme that l imits the circulation of 20% vehicles at peak -hours in the central area of the city.  The 
restriction is based on the final digit of vehicle’s l icense plates.  All  Brazil ian l icense plates have a number as their final d igit, so the driving 
restriction of São Paulo l imits the circulation of vehicles with l icense plates ending in 2 different numbers.   For example, on Mondays, vehicles 
with final digits 1 and 2 are restricted to circulate in the São Paulo Downtown Area.  Appendix D shows the Driving Restricti on Area of São Paulo 
and its overlap with the streets which had their speed limit altered in the period of our analysis. 
18 We acknowledge that this measure is not a completely perfect proxy for traffic volume.  First, we miss any information about non-restricted 
periods.  Moreover, the measure is biased in the presence of unobserved factors that affect the number of tickets but may not be associated with 








2014b 2015b 2016b 2017b
São Paulo
All Tickets 35.5 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.80 1.01 0.85
Driving Restriction 9.2 0.26 1.00 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.22
Speeding 19.2 0.54 1.00 0.26 0.43 0.56 0.47
Other 7.1 0.20 1.00 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.15
Marginais a
All Tickets 9.64 1.00 0.27 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.20
Driving Restriction 2.13 0.22 0.23 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05
Speeding 5.30 0.55 0.28 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.11




Note: Data extracted from the São Palo Traffic Agency (CET) website Painel de Mobilidade
Segura (http://mobilidadesegura.prefeitura.sp.gov.br). a Tickets in the Marginais include all




1.2.4    Travel Time 
Travel time and vehicle speed databases with high temporal and spatial granularity are also 
not readily available for São Paulo.  Therefore, in order to measure the effects of the speed limit 
changes on commuters’ travel time, we explore the emergence and development of mobile web 
APIs that provide real time information about road traffic.  Specifically, we simulated a set of 
representative motorized journeys using Google Directions API, which finds an optimal path for 
the provided pairs of origin and destination coordinates.  Moreover, the API estimates travel time 
of simulated trips given real-time traffic conditions that are collected from drivers using Google 
Maps routing services and GPS information from mobile phones (Google, 2009). 
The sample of representative journeys that we simulate was extracted from the São Paulo 
2012 Mobility Study, a household travel survey that interviewed 8,115 households, collecting 
detailed information about 46,861 trips designed to be representative of commuting patterns in the 
whole Metropolitan Region of São Paulo in a regular weekday.  Based on the start and end 
coordinates of motorized trips reported in this Survey, we ran a series of daily simulations using 
the web API.  For each simulation, we collected the estimated travel time given real-time traffic 
conditions at the moment of each query.  On total, we simulated 1.3 million trips between July 
2016 to September 2017, hence covering the period when the speed limit was increased from 
70km/h to 90km/h on the Marginais in January of 2017.  Table 1.6 presents some descriptive 
characteristics of the simulated trips from our study. 
1.2.5    Timeline of Policy Changes and Datasets 
Figure 1.5 summarizes the timeline of policy changes we evaluate in this paper and each 
of the datasets we use in our analyses.  While our dataset of road accidents overlaps the period 
from before and after the speed limit reductions of 2015, we do not have information about road 
accidents after the speed limit increase of 2017.  On contrary, while we do not have trip simulations 
from before the speed limit reductions of 2015 we do cover the before-and-after period in the case 




Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of Trips Simulated Using Google Directions API 
 (Jul/2017 – Sep/2018) 
 
 







Crawled Trips1 1,471.6 1.00 243.7 1.00
Post Speed Limit Increase2 511.5 0.35 84.8 0.35
Peak 562.2 0.38 96.8 0.40
Rain 93.6 0.06 15.6 0.06
Use Marginais3 243.7 0.17 243.7 1.00
Travel Time4 (Minutes) 20.00 17.11 38.42 19.83
Travel Length4 (km) 8.31 9.18 18.49 12.24
Ratio at Marginais3 0.04 0.12 0.22 0.21
All Crawled Trips Trips over Marginais3
Notes: 1 private vehicle trips reported on the 2012 São Paulo Mobility Household Surey were crawled on Google Directions
API using their origin and destination coordinates between July 4, 2016 and September 1, 2017. 2 The speed limit increase
in the Marginais was implemented in January 25, 2017. 3 We identify trips over the Marginais by comparing the intercect
between the optimal path suggested by OSRM API and a buffer of 200m around the Marginais shapefile.  All trips with more 
than 400m of intercection are defined as running through the Marginais. 4 Travel time and distance are reported by Google
Directions API for each query. 
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speed limit reductions, in the case of travel time we are limited to the 2017 speed limit increase.  
For both policies, we have information from driving restriction tickets, so we are able to evaluate 
their impacts on road volume. 
1.3    Empirical Model and Reduced Form Results 
In this session we describe our baseline empirical models used to estimate the impacts of 
the speed limit changes in São Paulo.  First, we investigate the effect of the 2015 speed limit 
reduction on road accident, and then, we explore our dataset of crawled trips to estimate the effect 
of the speed limit increase of 2017 on commuters’ travel time. 
1.3.1    The Effects of the 2015 Speed Limit Reductions on Road Accidents 
To identify the effect of the 2015 speed limit reductions on road accidents, we explore the 
time and geographical heterogeneity of speed limit reductions on different roads in São Paulo.  We 
start with a static model that assumes a single and constant treatment effect.  We then extend our 
estimation using a dynamic model that allows for the treatment effect to vary over time. 
All models are estimated using a panel of 1,578 road segments with 400m of length each.  
These segments compose all roads where the speed limit was reduced in 2015 and where at least 
one accident was reported in the period covered by our analysis. 
For each segment 𝑖, we identified the speed limit reduction date 𝑡𝑖
0 and all corresponding 
road accidents from 2012 to 2016.  We start our analysis by defining the “relative time distance” 
𝑑 of each panel observation to its corresponding speed limit reduction date 𝑡𝑖
0: 
𝑑 = 𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖
0 (1) 
Where 𝑡 is the calendar date of each panel observation, so 𝑑 indicates how far in time each 
panel observation is from its corresponding change date 𝑡𝑖
0.  We then aggregate the panel in time 
using bins of seven “relative days” so we avoid composition effects due to weekday 







From the relative distance of each observation to the treatment date, we have a direct 
correspondence to its treatment status 𝑇𝑖𝑤 , that is: 
𝑇𝑖𝑤 = 1        𝑖𝑓        𝑤 ≥ 0 
𝑇𝑖𝑤 = 0        𝑖𝑓        𝑤 < 0 
(3) 
Within this setup, each road segment before the speed limit reduction can be understood as 
a control observation for itself after the new speed limit is adopted.   Figure 1.6 illustrates our 
empirical design by plotting the average number of accidents and accident costs per segment per 
week by their relative distance to the speed limit reduction date. 
To calculate the average effect of the speed limit reduction on road damages, we estimate 
the following empirical model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑤 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑤 + 𝛾𝑇𝑖𝑤𝐶𝑖𝑤 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑇𝑖𝑤)𝐶𝑖𝑤 + 𝛾𝑋𝑤 + 𝑖𝑤 (4) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑤  can be any of the following variables: road accidents, road injuries, road 
fatalities, or total accident cost. Moreover, in each estimation the dependent variables are 
divided by their corresponding average by road type in the pre-treatment period, so the 
treatment effect is directly estimated as an average relative change.19 
 
 
                                                 
19 To adjust for segment heterogeneities and avoid overweighing observations with very few accidents, we weight each observation in the 




Figure 1.6: Average Number and Cost of Road Accidents per Segment per Week 
by Relative Time Distance to Speed Limit Reduction 
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As for the explanatory variables, 𝜇𝑖 is a road segment fixed effect that accounts for time 
invariant characteristics of segments. As described before, 𝑇𝑖𝑤  is an indicator if the speed limit 
was already reduced in segment 𝑖 on week 𝑤, so 𝛽 indicates the average effect of the policy net of 
camera effects and which is our main result of interest.  Additionally, 𝐶𝑖𝑤  indicates the presence 
of an active speed monitoring camera on segment 𝑖 during week 𝑤.  Therefore, while coefficient 
𝛾 can be interpreted as the effect of having a camera on a segment before the speed limit change, 
𝛿 indicates the similar effect after the policy change.  The difference between 𝛿 and 𝛾 indicate the 
interaction effect between the speed limit reduction and the presence of camera enforcement.  
Finally, 𝑋𝑤  is a vector of citywide time varying covariates.  It includes fuel sales, and calendar 
month fixed effect which account for within year seasonality. 
Additionally, to avoid possibly confounding effects caused by the placement of traffic signs 
and banners on treated roads in the weeks preceding the speed limit changes, in our baseline 
specification, we exclude observations from the four weeks immediately before the speed limit 
reduction in each segment. 
On Table 7 we present the estimation results of our empirical model using accident counts 
as our dependent variable.  We explore different model specifications, starting with Model 1 which 
does not account for any type of effect from speed control cameras.  In this case, the results indicate 
an average reduction in accident of 36% after the speed limit reduction.  We then add the camera 
covariate 𝐶𝑖𝑤on Model 2, and the results indicate that the presence of speed control cameras are 
associated with an average decrease of approximately 7.1% of accidents on the street segments 
where these cameras are present.  The inclusion of cameras as a covariate slightly decrease the 
point estimate for the speed limit reduction effect by about 0.9%.  Then, on Model 3, we separate 
the effect of cameras into two parts: 1) the effect of cameras before the speed limit reduction, and 
2) the effect of cameras after the speed limit reduction.  The results of this final specification show 
that the effect of cameras is significantly larger after the speed limit changes, indicating an 
important interaction effect between the policies.  Although the coefficient for the effect of 
cameras before the reduction is also negative, it is not significant, and the magnitude of the point 
estimate is about half of the effect of cameras after the speed limit reduction.  Overall, the results 
from these estimations indicate that even by accounting for the effect speed camera enforcement, 
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the speed limit reduction is still responsible for an average decrease of approximately 34.8% in 
traffic accidents on treated segments. 
Next, on Table 8, we present the results from our preferred specification for the different 
dependent variables included in our analysis.  The first line of results corresponds to the pooled 
sample where we include all treated road segments.  The second and third rows show the results 
for the estimation of the model where we subset the data to respectively the Marginais and arterial 
roads. 
 
Table 1.7: Regression Results: Changes in Road Accidents 
After Speed Limit Reductions of 2015 
 
 















Changes in Accident Counts (BRL)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.001. Coefficients indicate the average changes of
dependent variables with respect to pre-treatment means. For example, a coefficient of -0.5
indicates a reduction of 50%. Standard Errors are clustered by Street (202 clusters).
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Table 1.8: Regression Results: Changes in Road Accidents, Fatalities  
and Injuries after Speed Limit Reductions of 2015 by Road Type 
 
The point estimates indicate substantial decreases of road accidents on treated road 
segments.  As we had already seen from Table 1.7, the overall average reduction on accidents was 
of 34.8%.  Moreover, fatalities fell by 21.4%, road injuries decreased by 34.3% and accident costs 
by 27.5%.  When breaking down the results by road type, we observe that the estimated effects of 
the policy on the Marginais were larger for all variables, although the point estimates are less 
precise because of the lower count of events, particularly in the case of fatalities.  Meanwhile, the 
average policy effects on other arterial roads were roughly the same as in the pooled model, 
although slightly smaller in magnitude. 
These results assume a static treatment effect; however, the impacts of the speed limit 
reductions may present a dynamic pattern, with increasing or decreasing effects over time.  To 
investigate such possibility, we also estimate an extended version of our model where we break or 
treatment indicator 𝑇𝑖𝑤  by “relative quarters” after the speed limit reduction in each segment. 
𝑦𝑖𝑤 = 𝜇𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑄𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑤
𝑄
+ 𝛾𝑋𝑤 + 𝑖𝑤  (5) 
Figure 1.7 mirrors Table 1.8 by plotting the coefficients we estimate for each of our 
dependent variables and subsets of road types from the dynamic event study model.  The results 
-0.348 *** -0.343 *** -0.214 ** -0.275 ***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.070) (0.043)
-0.472 *** -0.451 *** -0.381 * -0.449 ***
(0.046) (0.058) (0.193) (0.121)
-0.337 *** -0.333 *** -0.198 * -0.259 ***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.077) (0.046)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.001. Coefficients indicate the average changes of
dependent variables with respect to pre-treatment means. For example, a coefficient of -0.5
indicates a reduction of 50%. Standard Errors are clustered by Street (202 clusters). Covariates







indicate that, overall, policy effects are increasing over time, with fewer road accidents and injuries 
per segments in the post-treatment treatment panel observations further away from the speed limit 
reduction in each segment.  However, in the case of road fatalities, and consequently accident 
costs, estimates are not sufficiently precise for a precise inference of dynamic patterns. 
1.3.1.1    Possibility Confounding Factors – Pre-treatment trends 
One underlying assumption required for the internal validity of our event study estimates 
is the absence of unobserved pre-treatment trends in the dependent variables.  To test for the 
validity of this assumption, we run the pair of tests proposed by Borusyak & Jaravel (2016).  First, 
we estimate an extended version of our dynamic model where we include pre-treatment relative 
quarter fixed effect terms.  We then run an F-test comparing the significance of including these 
coefficients in the estimation.  Figure 1.8 shows the plot of pre-treatment coefficients, indicating 
that almost none of the point estimates are individually significant.  Moreover, Table 1.9 shows 
the F-test for the statistical significance of pre-treatment coefficients as a group for each of our 
specifications.  The results indicate that the pre-treatment coefficients are mostly not significant, 
although some of the statistic are near the limits of 5% significance.  Therefore, these results 
indicate that although we cannot completely rule out unobserved pre-treatment trends in our 
dependent variables, the confounding effects of any existing trend is unlikely to affect 


















Table 1.9: F-Test statistics for the inclusion of  
pre-treatment quarter specific fixed effects 
1.806 * 1.694 0.765 1.050
0.622 1.514 0.937 1.100







1.3.1.2    Possibility Confounding Factors – Road Substitution 
An additional concern for the validity of our estimates as the causal effect of the speed 
limit reductions is that a possible unintended consequence of the policy is the diversion of drivers 
to other routes. If that was the case, at least part of the observed reduction in accidents could be 
caused not by an actual reduction in accident risk, but by the lower traffic volume on treated roads. 
To check if there was any road substitution associated with the speed limit reductions, we 
run two empirical tests.  First, we evaluate if the share of driving restriction tickets issued on treated 
road segments decreased after the speed limit reductions.  Second, we analyze the changes in road 
accidents on non-treated roads. The intuition behind the first experiment is that if the number of 
vehicles using treated roads had decreased after the speed limit reduction, then we should observe 
a proportional decrease in the number of driving restriction tickets issued on those same roads.  In 
the case of the second exercise, the idea is that if drivers substituted away from treated roads, and 
that led to a reduction in accidents in those roads, then, through the same mechanism, we should 
observe an increase in accidents on the roads where these drivers substituted to. 
In the case of driving restriction tickets, we first show the overlap between the driving 
restriction area of São Paulo and the roads with speed limit reductions.20  On total, about 38.3% of 
treated road segments are within the driving restriction area.  Moreover, out of the 225.4 thousand 
driving restriction tickets in our sample, 65.5% were registered on the roads which had their speed 
limit reduced in 2015.  Therefore, it is likely that if the number of cars circulating on these roads 
had decreased after the speed limit reductions, then we should be able to observe some effect on 
the share21 of tickets in these same roads. 
To test if the speed limit reductions led to a decrease in the share of driving restriction 
tickets on treated road segments, we estimate the following model:  
                                                 
20Appendix D maps the driving restriction area and the set of roads with speed limit reductions within it. 
21 We use shares instead of counts because, as described earlier in the background session, there was a large expansion in the n umber of traffic 
monitoring cameras in the period of our analysis. So, the count of tickets would be confounded b y the effect of camera expansion.  
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𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (6) 
Where 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑑 is the share of driving restriction tickets issued on road 𝑖 and date 𝑡. Like 
the accidents model, 𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the speed limit reduction status of road segment 𝑖 on day 𝑡.  The 
coefficient 𝛼𝑖 is a road segment fixed effect that controls for the average share of tickets issued on 
each road segment in the whole period.  We also estimate an extended version of the above model 
where we split the treatment effect by quarters after the policy change to investigate possible 
heterogeneities of the effect of interest on time.  Table 1.10 presents the results of these 
estimations.  The results indicates that the share of driving restriction tickets on treated road 
segments have not changed significantly after the speed limit reduction.  Overall the share of 
tickets increased by 0.5% after the policy, however such result is not statistically significant.  
Moreover, no significant pattern of any kind is observed from the dynamic model estimates. 
Table 1.10: Regression Results: Changes in the Share of Driving 












Road FE: yes yes
PSLRa
PSLR ℅ 1st Quarter
Changes in the Share of
Driving Restriction Tickets
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.001. Coefficients indicate changes
relative to the average before the speed limit reduction. A coefficient of -0.5
indicates a reduction of 50%.  a PSLR = Post Speed Limit Reduction
PSLR ℅ 2nd Quarter
PSLR ℅ 3rd Quarter




The point estimates of this regression are small and far from any statistical significance, 
indicating no evidence of any change in traffic volume associated with the speed limit reductions. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that using driving restriction tickets as a proxy 
for traffic volume have two main limitations: 1) the share of driving restriction tickets on treated 
segments may also be affected by the installation of new cameras on treated segments, so an 
eventual reduction in volume could counterweighted by the effect of additional cameras;  2) 
driving restriction tickets are constrained to peak hours, hence not fully reflecting all possible 
substitution patterns that could occur throughout the day. 
Given these limitations, we run an additional test for road substitution where we investigate 
the changes in road accidents on non-treated road segments in the city.  If diversion of traffic was 
responsible for the reduction of accidents on treated roads, then the reflexive effect would be an 
increase of accidents on other roads.  However, as seen in Figure 1.9, the total number of road 
accidents on non-treated roads does not seem to have increased after the speed limit reductions of 
2015. 
 
Figure 1.9: Road Accident on Roads Without  
Speed Limit Reductions per Quarter 
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Still, it could be the case that traffic from treated segments had moved to some specific 
road segments in the city, so the increase in accidents would not be reflected on city aggregates. 
Unfortunately, there is no trivial way to identify the most likely routes where drivers would 
substitute to.  However, since treated roads were composed by the city main arterial roads and 
highways, it is not unreasonable to assume that any substitution would be concentrated on the 
major roads segments from the non-treated group.  Therefore, to narrow our investigation of any 
potential substitution caused by the speed limit reduction, we focus our analysis on the larger road 
segments that were not affected by the speed limit reductions.  To identify such segments, we use 
the number of road accidents observed per segment before July 2015, the date of the first speed 
limit reduction.  We select all segments with 12 or more accidents in that period, a value that 
corresponds to the median among all non-treated segments.  Figure 1.10 shows the segments 
selected through this procedure, showing that they roughly delineate some specific roads which 
were not affected by the speed limit reduction policy. 
 
Figure 1.10: Non-Treated Road Segments with 12 or More 
Road Accidents Between Jan/2012-June/2015 
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We then estimate Equations 4 and 5 using these segments.  Because these segments do not 
have a speed limit reduction date associated with them, we define July 20, 2015 as a placebo 
treatment date for all segments.  The results from these estimations are presented in Table 1.11 
and Figure 1.11, and they indicate negligible effects of the speed limit reductions on accidents on 
non-treated roads.  If anything, although statistically non-significant, the point estimates indicate 
a small reduction of accidents on non-treated segments. 
Table 1.11: Regression Results: Changes in Road Accidents, Fatalities  
and Injuries on Non-Treated Road Segments after July 20, 2015  
 
 
Figure 1.11: Event-Study Results: Placebo Treatment Effects on  
Non-Treated Roads by Quarters After First Speed Limit Reduction 
-0.061 -0.072 -0.154 -0.125
(0.037) (0.044) (0.168) (0.108)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.001. Coefficients indicate the average changes of dependent
variables with respect to pre-treatment means. For example, a coefficient of -0.5 indicates a reduction of
50%. Standard Errors are clustered by Street (202 clusters). Covariates used in the model include: fuel





Summing up, given that we do not observe any changes in the share of driving restriction 
tickets on treated segments, and no increases of accidents on non-treated segments, we are led to 
the conclusion that road substitution is unlikely to have played any significant role in explaining 
the reduction in road accidents observed after the speed limit reductions. Hence, these results 
corroborate the validity of our main estimates as the causal effect of the speed limit reduction on 
the the decrease of accients on treated segments. 
1.3.2    The effect of the 2017 Speed Limit Increase on Commuting Time 
We now analyze the effect of the speed limit increase January 2017 on the travel time of 
drivers in São Paulo.  Using the dataset of trips simulated on Google Directions API, we compare 
the estimated travel time of trips before and after the policy change.  Our baseline empirical 
strategy can be described by the following equation: 
𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖ℎ𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖ℎ + 𝛽𝑀𝑎𝑖 𝐼𝑑 + 𝛾𝐼𝑑 + 𝛿𝑋ℎ𝑑 + ∑ 𝜙𝐿𝐵𝐿𝑖 𝐼𝑑
𝐿
+ 𝑖ℎ𝑑 (8) 
Where 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖ℎ𝑑 is the log of estimated travel time for each simulated trip 𝑖 queried at hour 
ℎ on date 𝑑.  As for the explanatory variables, 𝛼𝑖ℎ is a trip-hour fixed effect that controls for trips 
specific characteristics such as length, path and departure time.22  Moreover, 𝑀𝑎𝑖 indicates the 
share of each trip that takes place on the Marginais, and 𝐼𝑑 indicates if the query was made after 
the speed limit increase in January 25, 2017.  Therefore, while the coefficient 𝛾 captures the 
average change on estimated travel time for all trips, the coefficient 𝛽 indicates the additional 
travel time change that was specific for trips using the Marginais proportional to the share of trips 
made on those highways.  Moreover, 𝑋ℎ𝑑 is a vector of covariates that include the occurrence of 
rain in the moment of the query and if date 𝑑 was a holiday in São Paulo. 
Additionally, due to the interconnective of congestion effects within the road network, it is 
possible that the effects of the speed limit reduction may not be constrained to trips taken in the 
                                                 
22 In this model, a trip is defined as a pair of origin and destination coordinates queried at a certain hour of the day .  Therefore, a query that 
simulates traveling from point A to point B at 7am is considered as a different “trip” from the exact same query made at 8am. 
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Marginais.  Instead, travel time reductions could also occur on nearby roads due to spillover 
effects.  To account for these possible effects, we include in our specification a set of terms that 
identify the ratio of trips that take place within buffers of certain distances 𝐿 from the Marginais. 
In our baseline specification, we include three levels of non-overlapping buffers with respectively 
1km, 3km and 5km.  Figure 1.12 illustrates the areas created through this process. 
Table 1.12 shows the results from our regressions.  The first column corresponds to the 
simplest version of our empirical model, where we do not include the spillover area terms.  In this 
case, the main estimate of interest, that is the interaction between the speed limit increase indicator 
and the ratio of trips on the Marginais indicate a reduction of 6.5% on the estimated travel time for 
a trip completely made at the Marginais.  This effect is already accounting for an overall reduction 
 
Figure 1.12: Marginais and Possible Spillover Areas 
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of 1.8% in travel time for all trips in our sample, irrespectively if they used or not the Marginais.  
Moreover, the coefficients associated with our additional covariates indicate that while rain led to 
an average increase of 1.9% in travel time, on holidays trips were on average 10% faster. 
Table 1.12: Regression Results: Changes in Travel Time After the Marginais Speed Limit 
Increase of January 25, 2017  
 






-0.018 *** -0.011 ***
(0.004) (0.003)
-0.034 *** -0.035 *** -0.034 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)




0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
-0.100 *** -0.100 *** -0.096 *** -0.096 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Month FE
Obs.
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.001. Coefficients indicate the average changes of dependent variables with respect to pre-
treatment means. For example, a coefficient of -0.5 indicates a reduction of 50%. Standard Errors are clustered by date Street (191
clusters). Post SLI is a dummy that indicates queries made after the speed limit increase on the Marg. in January 25, 2017. Rain is a
dummy indicating if there was positive registers of rain during the hour of each query was made. Trip-Hour Fixed effects include a
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Post SLI - Ratio at Marg. - OffPeak
Changes in Estimated Travel Time
1,337,555
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Next on column 2 we include the covariates associated with the portion of trips that take 
place on the spillover areas.  The inclusion of these variables reduces the main treatment effect to 
5.8%.  However, for the portion of trips taking place within 1 km of the Marginais, the results 
indicate an average estimated travel time decrease of 3.4%, or approximately 60% of the main 
effect observed on the Marginais.  Similarly, the estimated spillover effects on the 3 km and 5 km 
buffers were of respectively 27% and 15% of the main effect, although the later was not 
statistically significant.  On column 3, we include month specific fixed effects, however that 
doesn’t affect any of the estimates significantly. 
Finally, on Column 4 we separate the main treatment effect into two parts, one associated 
with trips taken during peak hours, and other for trips in the off-peak.  The results from this split 
indicate that most of the travel time reduction in the Marginais occurred in off-peak hours, when 
the corresponding point estimate indicate an average reduction of 7.5%.  meanwhile, for the peak 
period, the average reduction was of only 2.7% and the point estimate for this coefficient is not 
statistically significant. 
Lastly, similar to the case of our empirical model for accidents, we estimate an event -
studies version of our model where we interact our main treatment effect component with each 
quarter after the policy change.  The resulting estimates associated with the share of trips in the 
Marginais and spillover areas are presented on Figure 1.13.  It indicates that the treatment effect 
of the policy seems to be increasing on time, with larger travel time reduction for trips further 
away in time to the policy change.  Meanwhile, the spillover effects do not seem to present any 
clear dynamic pattern over time. 
Summing up the results of our empirical models, we have found that the speed limit 
reductions of 2015 were associated with a reduction of approximately 34.8% on road accidents 
and 21.4% of road fatalities on treated segments.  Moreover, we did not find any evidence of traffic 
volume reduction associated with the policy.  Meanwhile, after the speed limit increase of 2017, 
the portion of trips that take place on the Marginais became approximately 6.5% faster.  In the next 





Figure 1.13: Event-Study Results: Changes in Travel Time After 
the Speed Limit Increase on the Marginais 
1.4    Cost-Benefit Analysis 
To compare the social costs and benefits of the speed limit changes that were implemented 
in São Paulo, we first assign a monetary value to road accidents and travel time using standard 
parameters from the literature.  Next, given the policy impacts estimated in our previous session, 
we construct counterfactual scenarios where we calculate accident costs and travel time losses 
under alternative speed limit policies.  We compare the social costs and benefits calculated in these 
counterfactual scenarios with the values that were actually observed, thus computing the total costs 
and benefits for each of the policies changes that were implemented in the city.  Next, we focus 
our analysis in the case of the speed limit reduction in the Marginais, where we are able to net out 
the effect of enforcement, and compare the specific effect of speed limit reduction on accidents 
and travel time.  Moreover, by exploring the individual level characteristics of our datasets, we 
evaluate the distribution of these specific costs and benefits throughout different groups of society. 
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1.4.1    Social Benefits of the 2015 Speed Limit Reductions 
Table 1.13 summarizes our results for the benefits associated with the speed limit 
reductions of 2015.  The first row of the table indicates the total monetary costs of road accidents 
observed on business days23 of 2016 where each column corresponds to different road group.  The 
total cost of accidents is estimated in R$ 2.8 billion, and the share of this amount associated with 
accidents that take place on the Marginais, arterial, and other roads is of respectively 3%, 35%, 
and 62%.  Next, based on the policy impacts estimated in session 3.1 we calculate a series of 
counterfactual scenarios where we simulate what would be the costs of accidents in São Paulo if 
the speed limit reduction of 2015 had not been implemented. 
Table 1.13: Yearly Benefits due to Accidents Reduction  
After the Speed Limit Reductions of 2015 
 
                                                 







Observed Costs 2,805.9 86.4 985.3 1,734.2
Share 1.00 0.03 0.35 0.62
Speed Limit, Cameras and Spillovers
Counterfactual Costs 3,546.9 175.3 1,389.7 1,981.9
Policy Benefits 741.0 88.9 404.4 247.7
Share of Benefits 1.00 0.12 0.55 0.33
Speed Limit and Cameras
Counterfactual Costs 3,299.2 175.3 1,389.7 1,734.2
Policy Benefits 493.3 88.9 404.4 -
Share of Benefits 1.00 0.18 0.82 -
Speed Limit Effects Only
Counterfactual Costs 3,250.1 156.8 1,359.0 1,734.2
Policy Benefits 444.2 70.4 373.7 -
Share of Benefits 1.00 0.16 0.84 -
Notes: a All scenarios are based on the road accidents observed in 2016 businessdays. Counterfactual scenarios are
based on the policy impacts estimated from our reduced form empirical models.  All values are converted to BRL of 2016 
based on IBGE IPCA inflation index




First, we estimate the total increase in road accidents if we consider all the effects for speed 
limit reduction, interaction with camera enforcement, and spillovers effects on non-treated roads.  
In this case, the total policy benefit would be of R$ 741 million, with 33% of this amount deriving 
from spillover effects.  Next, we estimated a more conservative counterfactual where we assume 
null spillover effects on non-treated roads.  In this case, the total policy benefit would be of about 
R$ 493 million per year.  Finally, in our last simulation, we exclude the enforcement effect and its 
interaction with the speed limit change, hence isolating the policy effect due to speed limit 
reductions only.  In this case, we estimate a total policy benefit of R$ 444 million, out of which 
R$ 70.4 would be due to accident reduction in the Marginais. 
1.4.2    Social Benefits of the 2017 Speed Limit Increase 
Now, moving to the other side of the cost benefit analysis, we calculate the monetary value 
of time savings using two alternative parameters for the value of time (VOT).  First, as our central 
case, and similar to van Benthem (2015), we use the after-taxes hourly wage of individuals.  
Although we use this parameter as our central case so we can compare our results with Van 
Benthem, this value should be seen as an upper bound for the policy welfare impacts on travel 
time.  The USDOT recommends assigning half of the hourly wage for non-business trips within 
local urban settings (USDOT, 2014), meanwhile, the empirical literature has consistently 
identified an average VOT of approximately 50% of wage rate (Wolff, 2014).  Therefore, as an 
alternative, and possibly more reasonable parameter, we also calculate policy benefits using the 
Victoria Transport Policy Institute (VTPI) guidelines which suggests assigning a VOT of 150% of 
travelers’ wage for business trips, 50% for commuting (35% if passenger), 25% for personal travel, 
and 0% for leisure or vacation (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2016).   
Table 1.14 reports the results of our calculations based on these two different parameters. 
The first set of columns refer to the results using a the after-tax hourly wage VOT, and the second 
set reports the results using the VTPI VOT.  Like in the case of accidents, the first line of the table 
shows the baseline total cost of time in traffic observed in 2016, that is, accounting for the fact that 




Table 1.14: Yearly Benefits due to Travel Time Savings After the 2017 Reduction of Travel Time  
 
counterfactuals for the speed limit increase to 90km/h; first including spillover effects on nearby 
roads, and second restricting the travel time effects to treated roads only.  In the first case, the 
value of total travel time savings would be of R$ 134.8 million if we use our upper bound VOT 
and R$ 57.4 million if adopt the VTPI VOT.  However, if we exclude the spillover effects, those 
values decrease to respectively R$ 56.8 million and R$ 25.5 million. 
1.4.3    Comparing the Cost and Benefits of Speed Limit Changes in the Marginais 
It is important to notice that the speed limit reductions of 2015 and the speed limit reversal 
of 2017 should not be directly compared in their totality because the former affected the city 
highways and arterial roads, and included a large expansion of camera enforcement. Meanwhile, 
the speed limit reversal of 2017 was restricted to the Marginais and was not accompanied by any 
substantial changes in enforcement.  Therefore, to narrow down the comparison of policy costs 
and benefits, we focus on the speed limit changes in the Marginais.  For these particular roads, we 
have from our reduced form results: 1) an estimation of benefits due to accident reductions (R$ 
70.4 million) from the 2015 policy that excludes the effects of camera enforcement; 2) a range of 












Observed Costs 15,361.6 1,170.6 3,261.3 10,929.7 6,286.1 524.5 1,327.0 4,434.5
Counterfactual Costs 15,226.8 1,113.8 3,183.3 10,929.7 6,228.9 499.1 1,295.3 4,434.5
Policy Benefits 134.8 56.8 78.0 - 57.2 25.5 31.7 -
SLI Effects - Marginais Only
Counterfactual Costs 15,304.8 1,113.8 3,261.3 10,929.7 6,260.6 499.1 1,327.0 4,434.5
Policy Benefits 56.8 56.8 - - 25.5 25.5 - -
VOT = After-Tax Wages VOT = VTPI guidelines
Cost of Time Spent in Traffic
(BRL Million)
Notes: All scenarios are based on the expansion of household survey trips made by private vehicle to all business days of 2016. Counterfactual scenarios are based on our
empirical results of policy impacts.  All values are converted to BRL of 2016 by the IBGE IPCA inflation index.  




reversal.24  Hence, if we assume that travel time effects observed in 2017 were the inverse of the 
2015 speed limit reduction impacts, we are able to isolate and compare the benefits and costs 
associated with the 2015 speed limit reduction in the Marginais.  Hence, if we accept this 
assumption of an inverted travel time effect given a speed limit increase or reduction, we can 
calculate that the benefit/cost ratio of the 2015 speed limit reduction was of approximately 1.23 if 
we use our upper bound VOT, and to 2.76 if we consider the VTPI VOT.  As a conservative 
approach, we chose the first of these values as our central case for the following analysis.  
Next, we compare the sensitivity of this result given alternative parameters for the Value 
of Statistical Life (VSL), which is the main driver of policy costs associated with road accidents.  
Given the underlying uncertainty about this parameter, an interesting value to be identified is the 
minimum VSL for which a speed limit reduction would still be socially worthwhile, which we 
define as the policy breakeven VSL.  Figure 1.14 shows the result of this analysis.  The x-axis 
indicates a continuous of VSL values, and we highlight with vertical lines the following values: 1) 
the breakeven VSL for our central case of total policy costs where VOT is calculated at after -tax 
hourly wages; 2) our baseline VSL parameter of R$ 4.54 million taken from Viscusi & Masterman 
(2017); 3) the EPA recommended VSL of R$ 20.1 million for the USA.  Moreover, the horizontal 
lines indicate the total cost of the speed limit reduction given our alternative VOTs parameters.  
The results of this analysis indicate that the speed limit reductions in the Marginais would 
still be socially worthwhile up to a VSL larger than R$ 3.2 million, or about 70% of our central 
case value.  However, if we consider the VTPI VOT parameters, the breakeven VSL would 
approach zero as the reduction of costs from non-fatal accidents would already be sufficiently large 
to compensate for the increases in commuting time.  Finally, if we consider the VSL suggested by 
the USA EPA, the policy benefits would be more than 3.6 times larger than our maximum 
estimated policy costs. 
                                                 
24 In our cost -benefit analysis we do not include the spillover effects from travel time and accidents because in the case of accidents, we cannot 
isolate the spillover effects from the treatment of the Marginais from the treatment of arterial roads and their corresponding spillovers.  However, 
given the underlying mechanisms that associate travel speed and the probability of road accidents, our evidence indicates that any spillover 
effects on travel time would be accompanied by a corresponding effect on accidents.  Therefore, by excluding the spillover ef fects from both 
travel time savings and accidents, we should not change dramatically the cost benefit-ratio of police if compared to an evaluation that was able 
to incorporate both effects.  If the dataset of accidents from 2017 is released, we will  be able to empirically test th e effects of the 2017 speed 




Figure 1.14: Cost-Benefit Analysis: Sensitivity of Results to Alternative Parameters  
1.4.4    Distributive Analysis of Speed Limit Changes in the Marginais 
Next, we take our central case parameters and evaluate the distribution of policy costs and 
benefits throughout different segments of society.  Common among our databases, we have the 
education attainment of commuters from our household travel survey, and accident victims from 
our database of road accidents.  Although we do not have income information about accident 
victims, we base our distributive considerations on the strong correlation between education 
attainment and wealth.  Figure 1.15 evidences this relationship for the case of São Paulo by plotting 
the average income of adults (age > 18 ) from the household survey by education attainment. 
To compute our distributive analysis, we assume that all the effects of the speed limit 
reduction on road accidents and travel time are equally distributed irrespectively of individuals 
education attainment.  For example, if two individuals with distinct income levels are observed 
making the exact same trips on the Marginais, then we assume that their corresponding travel time 
changes after the speed limit reduction should be the same.  Moreover, since on the benefit side 
we only have an average VSL for the whole population, we also compute the distribution of costs 
using a single average VOT to avoid different skewing of the cost-benefit components.25  
                                                 
25 Although it would be possible to calculate individual specific VSLs with our data, that would imply assigning distinct values  to the life of 




Figure 1.15: Average Income by Education 
Attainment in São Paulo, Brazil 
Given these assumption, Figure 1.16 plots the mean costs and benefits of the speed limit 
reduction in the Marginais by education attainment of individuals in São Paulo.  Since groups 
differ in terms of total number of individuals, we present the results in per capita terms.  The figure 
indicates a clear distinction in the distribution of costs and benefits.  While the benefits are larger 
for individuals with no primary, primary and secondary education the travel time costs seem to 
have a particularly larger effect on the group of individuals with college education, which becomes 
the only group for which travel time losses are larger than accident reduction benefits. 
To investigate the mechanisms behind these distributive effects, we investigate two 
variables: 1) since the main component of accident costs are fatalities, we verify the distribution 
of road deaths by education; 2) on the cost side, we examine the use of private vehicles by group.  
The resulting diagrams of these variables are presented on Figure 1.17, which shows on the y-axis 
the relative participation of each of these variables compared to the overall population of São 
Paulo.  A negative value indicates that the participation of individuals from the corresponding 
group is below the share of individuals from this group in the population of São Paulo.  A positive 




Figure 1.16: Per Capita Distribution of Cost and Benefits by Education Attainment: 
Speed Limit Reduction at the Marginais 
 
 





The use of private vehicles is relatively larger for individuals of higher income levels.  
Moreover, in the specific case of people who use private vehicles at the Marginais, the 
concentration is even more accentuated.  Meanwhile, the relative distribution of road fatalities is 
larger for the individuals with primary education, and in the case of pedestrians, it is also larger 
for those below primary attainment. 
Therefore, the heterogeneity of impacts from the speed limit reduction on the Marginais 
can be explained by these two factors. On one hand, people who use private vehicles and are more 
heavily harmed by longer commuting time tend to be wealthier.  On the other hand, road fatalities 
are not evenly distributed in the society, as lower and lower-middle income individuals are 
overrepresented as the fatal victims of road accidents.26 
1.5    Comparison of Results with the Literature 
To the extent of our knowledge, within the applied economic literature, the study that most 
closely approximates to our paper is van Benthem (2015), henceforth VB.  Although both paper 
conduct an ex-post evaluation of impacts from speed limit changes, it is important to notice that 
there are important differences with respect to the setting evaluated in the papers.  While VB 
examines speed limit changes from more than 20 years ago on regional freeways in western USA27, 
our study examines a policy change from 2015 on urban roads in a metropolitan area of the 
developing world.  Therefore, when comparing the results from both papers, it is important to 
acknowledge that each of these distinct dimensions may play an important role in explaining the 
differences between their results.   
Importantly, VB evaluated the effects of a speed limit increase, and us, a speed limit 
reduction.  Therefore, to align the direction of results, we invert his labels of costs and benefits, so 
we use “costs” to refer to the value of additional travel time, and “benefits” to refer to reductions 
in accidents. 
                                                 
26 Possible reasons for these differences in fatality rates may include the proportion of travelers who use motorcycle, the abil ity to afford safety 
features on vehicles, and differences in driving behavior.  Although this is a highly relevant question, identifying the prec ise mechanisms that 
drive the road mortality differentials is beyond the scope of our paper. 
27 The roads evaluated in van Benthem (2015) were located in the states of California, Oregon and Washington. 
43 
 
Table 1.15: Comparison of Results with van Benthem (2015) 
 
Table 1.15 summarizes the comparable results between the two studies.28  First, it is worth 
noticing that the VSL and VOT parameters used in our study were both about 20% of the main 
parameters used by VB, which facilitates the comparison of results as we have no major differences 
in the VSL/VOT ratio. 
With respect to reduced form policy impacts we have found very similar effects of the 
speed limit changes on travel time, with an average effect of approximately 6% in the same 
direction as the limit change.  However, the main difference between the studies was the estimation 
of impacts on accidents.  While we found a decrease of non-fatal accidents that was 3.37 larger in 
magnitude, our estimated policy impact on road fatalities was about half of his.  The difference in 
non-fatal accidents is an important result as it is precisely estimated in our model.  If we calculate 
policy costs using the VTPI VOT, the breakeven VSL approaches zero as the changes in non-fatal 
accidents alone compensate the losses in travel time. 
                                                 
28 Besides the items listed here, van Benthem (2015) results include the effects of the speed limit changes on air pollution and its consequent 
impacts on health.  While these effects are estimated to approximately double the social costs of speed limit increases, they are which are 
admittedly uncertain by the author.  Unfortunately, we lack the required data to carry a similar analysis on this effect.  Th erefore, when comparing 










Cost-Benefit ResultsTravel Time Savings 14.81 185.8 12.5
Benefits/Costs 1.46 2.21 0.66
Breakeven VSL ratio
a 0.70 0.50 1.39
Main Parameters
VSL (U$ Million) 1.72 8.78 0.20
VOT (U$ per hour) 3.89 18.31 0.21
Reduced Form Estimates
Travel Time 0.057 0.059 0.97
Accidents
    non-fatal 0.47 0.14 3.37
    fatal 0.21 0.44 0.49




In both studies, the benefits related to fewer accidents were found to be larger than the 
costs due to longer travel times.  However, while in his study the central benefit/cost ratio was of 
2.21, in our case the same ratio was about 1.46.  Moreover, the relative breakeven VSL was about 
40% higher in our study, which is also an indicator of smaller policy benefits in our setting.  There 
are different factors that contribute to this differences in ratios, but primarily, our lower effect on 
fatal accidents is key as road fatalities are the main components of road accident costs.  
In synthesis, compared to VB, our study has also identified that the gains associated with 
lower accidents are larger than travel time losses.  This result was found while using a VOT that 
is admittedly likely to overestimate the costs of travel time if compared to recommended 
parameters from the literature.  Given that we estimated the impacts of a speed limit reduction in 
a completely different setting from VB, the similarity of results supports the external validity for 
claiming that speed limit policies are an effective tool for reducing road accidents without 
imposing net welfare losses to society. 
1.6    Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the outcomes associated with a set of policies that altered traffic 
speed limits in São Paulo Brazil.  We have identified that after a series of speed limit reductions 
in 2015, there was a large decrease in road accidents and fatalities on treated road segments.  We’ve 
shown that this reduction in accidents cannot be attributed to road substitution or pre-intervention 
downward trends.  Moreover, by scrapping data about traffic congestion from a web API, we were 
able to identify that after a speed limit increase adopted in 2017, the estimated travel time of trips 
using the affected roads has gone down.  We also shown no evidence of road substitution 
associated with this policy. 
Combining these results with standard parameters from the literature, we compared the 
costs and benefits of the speed limit reduction adopted in the city urban highways in 2015.  
According to our calculations, the benefits of the policy outweighed its costs even in our most 
conservative choice of parameters.  Moreover, we’ve shown that the policy had a progressive 
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impact as the reduction in accidents had a larger impact for lower- and middle-income groups, 
while travel time losses were larger for wealthier individuals. 
We acknowledge that our analysis is not final for a complete assessment of speed limit 
changes impacts.  Our representative sample of trips constrains our analysis to trips made by 
residents on business days, so we do not account for policy impacts on freight transportation and 
trips made by non-residents.  Therefore, we may not be accounting for an important share of social 
costs associated with a speed limit reduction.  On the other hand, we also do not account for the 
policy benefits associated with pollution and health, which although uncertain, are estimated by 
Van Benthem (2015) to double the assessment of policy benefits. 
Moreover, an important aspect which is specific about our setting and we have not fully 
explored is the magnitude of the enforcement structure employed in São Paulo.  In the year of 
2016, the city issued 6.7 million speeding tickets, more than half a ticket per resident.  The local 
government of São Paulo collected approximately R$ 1.1 billion from these tickets, an amount that 
is larger than our overall assessment of gross policy benefits associated with all speed limit 
reductions adopted in 2015.  In principle, this amount corresponds to a mere transference of 
resources, so it should not affect the social welfare impacts of the policy.  However, given its 
magnitude, it imposes non-negligible distributive effects that we have not considered in our 
analysis and certainly deserve a further investigation. 
As for the external validity of our results, it is obviously limited given the case-study nature 
of our analysis.  However, several cities throughout the world are recently experimenting with 
stricter speed limit policies, therefore an interesting exercise would be to compare outcomes 
similar to the ones obtained in our study to evaluate the heterogeneity of policy impacts on different 
types of urban areas. 
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Chapter 2: Affirmative Action in Brazilian 
Universities: Effects on the Enrollment of 
Targeted Groups 
With Mary Arends-Kuenning 
This paper investigates how the adoption of affirmative action for college 
admission affected the enrollment of students from socioeconomically 
disadvantaged groups in Brazil.  We explore the time heterogeneity of policy 
adoption by Brazilian universities to identify the policy effects while accounting for 
time confounding unobservables.  Our analysis indicate that the adoption of 
affirmative action policies led to an increase in the enrollment of students from 
groups explicitly targeted by each policy, particularly public high-school students 
and Blacks.29   As for the heterogeneities of policy impacts, larger effects were 
observed for more competitive and more prestigious academic programs.  Lastly, 
we found that universities that adopted affirmative action policies with explicit 
racial criteria experienced an increase in the enrollment of Black students; 
meanwhile, universities that adopted race-blind policies had no significant changes 
in the racial profile of their admitted students. 
Keywords: Affirmative Action, Access to Higher Education, Race-Blind vs. Race-
Conscious Policies 
Affirmative action policy (AAP) for college admission is a common practice worldwide; it has 
the objective of mitigating discrimination by providing access to educational opportunities that 
otherwise would not be available to individuals from disadvantaged groups.  This study examines 
the adoption of such policies in Brazil, one of the most unequal countries in the world30 and where 
                                                 
29 The standard racial/skin-color categories used by the Brazilian Statistical Agency (IBGE) include: Branco (light-skinned), Preto 
(black-skinned), Amarelo (yellow – mainly referring to Chinese and Japanese origin), Pardo (brown-skinned and/or mixed) and 
Indígena (Native American or indigenous).  The Portuguese term “Pardo” is especially ambiguous (Cicalò, 2008), and any direct 
translation to English may be misleading.  Therefore, following other English-written studies on the topic, we use the original 
Portuguese terms to refer to the standard racial categories used in Brazil.  However, Brazilian affirmative action policies were 
often defined to target the combined categories of Pretos and Pardos, which are denoted in Portuguese as “Negros”.  To avoid 
any possible confusion with the English term “Negro”, which may have a derogatory connotation, we use the English word 
“Blacks” to refer to the combined groups of Pretos and Pardos. 
30 With a Gini coefficient of 52.87, Brazil ranks 10th among world countries in terms of inequality as measured by this coefficient 
(World Bank, 2017). 
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the educational opportunity gap between individuals of different socioeconomic strata is one of 
the main channels of intergenerational inequality persistence (Barros, Foguel, & Ulyssea, 2006).  
Barriers to access to tertiary education are viewed as particularly relevant for reducing inequality 
because returns to college degrees are exceptionally high in Brazil (OECD, 2016).31  Not 
surprisingly, limited access to higher education is an important mechanism restri cting income 
mobility in the country (Ferreira & Veloso, 2006).  Therefore, with the objective of improving the 
access of deprived individuals to higher education, Brazilian universities started experimenting 
with AAPs in the early 2000s, and within less than a decade, most public colleges had adopted 
some type of AAP for selecting their students.  However, it is still not clear how effective these 
policies were in changing the profile of students enrolled in these academic programs. 
This paper aims to answer that question by investigating the impacts of AAP adoption on 
the profile of students enrolled in academic program subject to those policies.  To identify the 
causal effects of AAPs, we explore the heterogeneity of policy adoption by different universities 
between 2004 and 2012, a period when each Brazilian federal institution had full discretion to 
define their own set of admission policies.  We explore a rich dataset containing socioeconomic 
information from a large sample of freshmen students from all Brazilian federal universities.  
Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we compare changes in the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of students enrolled in Universities that introduced AAP with 
changes observed in institutions that did not adopt those policies.  By including a control group, 
our estimates account for unobserved shocks that were concurrent to the adoption of AAP and that 
may have affected the selection of students in Brazilian higher education irrespectively of AAP 
adoption.  Moreover, because our dataset includes a large number of academic programs from all 
Brazilian federal universities, we are able to further investigate the heterogeneity of policy effects.  
First, we examine how impacts differed with respect to program competitiveness.  Second, we 
evaluate the outcomes of distinct types of policies, contrasting race-blind with race-conscious 
AAPs. 
Our results indicate that the AAPs evaluated in our study were effective in increasing the 
enrollment of individuals from groups explicitly targeted by each policy, particularly students who 
                                                 
31 The OECD report indicates that, in Brazil, someone with a college degree earns on average 3.4 times more than someone with 
completed secondary education only.  This differential is the highest among all OECD and partner countries (OECD, 2016). 
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graduated from public high-schools, a characteristic strongly associated with socioeconomic status 
and which was the most common eligibility criteria for the policies adopted in the period of our 
analysis.  Moreover, while the impacts were larger for more prestigious academic programs, they 
were mostly negligible for less competitive ones.  Finally, and most importantly, we observed that 
the outcomes of the policies were limited in the case of deprived groups not explicitly targeted by 
each policy.  For example, the enrollment of Black students was mostly unaffected by APPs with 
race-blind eligibility criteria.  In contrast, race-conscious policies led to a significant increase in 
the enrollment of Blacks. 
Compared to the existing empirical literature, our study has the novelty of evaluating the 
outcomes of AAP in a setting where universities employ objective and publicly known criteria for 
student selection, but where institutions had discretion to experiment with different types of 
admission policies.  In American universities — which are the object of study of the largest portion 
of the literature — the selection of students is based on a complex and subjective set of attributes, 
and universities are not required to disclose the weight of racial preferences in their admission 
processes, hence the exact effects of AAPs on student selection are not identifiable.  Meanwhile 
in India, — which is another country with an extensive literature investigating the effects of AAP 
— public universities are required to comply with specific AAPs that are imposed by the 
government.  Therefore, in the Indian case, there is limited heterogeneity in the policies adopted 
by each university, precluding the empirical comparison of outcomes from different types of 
policies. 
Our study also differs from the existing literature that examines the effects of AAPs in 
Brazil which are mostly restricted to the outcomes of individual university experiences.  In 
contrast, our analyses comprise all Brazilian federal universities, including the ones that had not 
adopted any type of AAP in the period of our evaluation.  That is an important contribution of our 
study because concomitantly with the adoption of AAPs by Brazilian universities, structural 
changes were taking place in the country with far-reaching impacts on the application and selection 
of students to tertiary education.  First, the total number of undergraduate positions increased from 
3.03 million in 2001 to 5.45 million in 2010.  Most of this growth was associated with a large 
expansion of private universities, which were boosted by a set of federal policies aimed to help 
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lower income students to cover and finance their college tuition expenses.32  Moreover, during this 
period, Brazil was experiencing a positive economic cycle, with extensive impacts on income 
distribution and employment.33  Each of these factors had important impacts on the pool of students 
applying to and enrolling in Brazilian public universities.  Hence, the isolated effects of AAP on 
the enrollment of deprived students is hindered by the simultaneity of these processes, and the 
evaluation of policy outcomes that are based on a single university’s experiences are likely to be 
overestimated as they cannot account for the effects of these simultaneous processes.   
In synthesis, our paper has the novelty of examining the effects of AAPs on the enrollment 
of students from targeted deprived groups based on an ex-post evaluation of policy impacts on a 
large number of universities and several types of academic programs, accounting for time-
confounding structural changes and comparing the effects of different types of AAPs in a setting 
where the criteria for student selection were transparent and different types of policies were 
adopted by different institutions. 
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows.  Section I describes in further details the 
use of AAPs for student admission and revisits the existing empirical literature about its impacts 
and the institutional background of its adoption in Brazil.  Section II details our data and Section 
III presents our empirical strategy and discusses its results.  Finally, Section IV concludes.  
2.1    Background 
2.1.1    AAPs for College Admission throughout the world 
In the international context, selection processes with specific rules to favor individuals 
from historically disadvantaged groups date from as early as the first years of the Twentieth 
                                                 
32 The most important of such policies were the Student Financing Fund for Higher Education  (FIES) and the University for All 
Program (PROUNI).  The first of these policies, FIES, was established in 1999, and it was designed to provide subsidized credit 
for students to finance their tuition and fees in private universities.  By 2004, the program included 312,000 contracts, 
corresponding to about 10% of all students enrolled on private universities.  In that same year, the Federal government created 
an additional program, PROUNI, a program that offered partial and total scholarships for students enrolled on private 
institutions.  By 2013, 37.3% of private university students were beneficiaries of FIES and 11.9% of PROUNI (Corbucci, Kubota, 
& Meira, 2016). 
33 Between 2003 and 2014, the real income level of the Brazilian poorest 40% rose 7.1% per year (World Bank, 2017). 
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Century when the first reservation policies were adopted in colonial British India  (Laskar, 2010).  
However, the term “affirmative action” was first coined in the 1960s when the U.S. presidency 
passed a set of executive orders with the objective of addressing the country’s historical legacy of 
discrimination against minorities, particularly African Americans.  Subsequently, several 
American universities voluntarily implemented AAPs giving preferential treatment to candidates 
from minority groups (Holzer & Neumark, 2006).  Following this initial process, a contentious 
debate emerged about the use of AAP for college admission in the U.S., ultimately resulting in a 
set of Supreme Court landmark decisions on the legality of these policies.  Still, AAP remains one 
of the most controversial policy topics not only in the U.S. but in other countries where it is 
practiced.   
Interconnected with the public debate, the academic literature investigating the 
effectiveness and other aspects of AAPs is also extensive,34 although the majority of empirical 
studies are still limited to the evaluation of policy outcomes in the USA.  Yet, in recent years, the 
adoption of AAPs in other countries has gained broader attention from researchers, particularly 
the experiences of Indian universities.  Meanwhile, other major countries have also experimented 
with AAPs for college admission, including China, Brazil, South Africa, and Malaysia among 
others.  However, the empirical investigation of policy impacts is still limited in the case of these 
nations. 
In the USA, the existing literature indicates that AAPs have increased the probability of 
racial minorities to be admitted to and enrolled in American universities, particularly in top-tier 
colleges (Epple, Romano, & Sieg, 2008), (Long, 2004), (Arcidiacono, 2005).  However, the 
precise effect of these policies is not easily identifiable because American universities are not 
required to disclose the weight of racial preference in their admission processes (Holzer & 
Neumark, 2006).  In recent years, state bans on race-based admission policies have been explored 
by empirical researchers to estimate the impacts of AAP on the admission and enrollment of 
minorities.  For instance, Hinrichs (2012) and Backes (2012) report substantial reductions of 
African Americans, Hispanics and Native American enrollments in top American colleges after 
these bans.  Once again, effects on non-top colleges were found to be mostly negligible.  
                                                 
34 For a general review of the literature on AAP, see (Holzer & Neumark, 2006). 
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Meanwhile, Card & Krueger (2005) showed that applications to colleges by minority students with 
high academic performance were not affected by the policy bans, so the enrollment reductions of 
minorities could not be explained by a diversion in the applications of AAP targeted students. 
An important question of interest about the outcomes of AAPs in the USA relates to the 
effectiveness of Race-Blind AAPs on indirectly improving access to college for racial minorities.  
Favoring individuals based on race is one of the most controversial aspects of AAPs, therefore 
race-blind policies are less likely to be politically and/or legally rejected.  Examples of race-blind 
AAPs are the “top-x%” programs, which grant admission to students ranked in the top x percentile 
of their high-school cohort.  Because of the legal and political challenges to race-based AAPs in 
some American states, these programs were designed to increase university access for minority 
students without explicitly targeting race or ethnicity, basically by exploiting the racial segregation 
of American neighborhoods.  Long (2004) argued that these programs would not be able to achieve 
the same outcomes as explicitly race-conscious AAPs.  However, Kapor (2016) showed that the 
Texas top 10% program increased the enrollment of minority students by about 10% at Texas 
flagship universities and attracted students with stronger academic performances compared to 
typical race-conscious AAPs.  This result suggests that well designed race-blind policies could 
achieve the outcome of significantly improving access to opportunities for underprivileged racial 
minorities.  However, the generalization of such a result to other experiences is still an empir ical 
question. 
With respect to the outcomes of AAP in the developing world, the experiences of Indian 
universities have attracted the attention of applied economists in recent years.  In contrast to the 
American setting, Indian universities normally rely on objective and straightforward methods for 
admission.  Students applying to college are ranked based on their performance on standardized 
exams, and the top ranked students are selected for admission.  Therefore, the effects of AAPs in 
changing the enrollment of students from deprived groups can be directly computed (Frisancho & 
Krishna, 2016).  Moreover, detailed databases of students are available, allowing researchers to 
follow not only the applicants who were admitted to a certain college, but also those who were 
rejected.  As a result, in the case of Indian universities it is possible to identify the exact students 
who were admitted and displaced due to AAPs, and further investigate their academic performance 
and post-educational outcomes.  By tracking individuals who applied to Indian engineering 
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colleges with quotas for certain castes, Bertrand, Hanna, & Mullainathan  (2010) showed that those 
who were admitted directly because of AAP came from less wealthy households than the displaced 
applicants.  Moreover, policy beneficiaries experienced positive returns to labor market earnings 
due to their college enrollment.  Similarly, Bagde, Epple, & Taylor (2016) reported that the Indian 
AAPs in engineering colleges increased enrolment of students from targeted groups, with larger 
effects for the most disadvantaged castes and no evidence of college “mismatch” associated with 
the policy. 
However, the evaluations of AAP outcomes from Indian experiences are still limited in at 
least two dimensions.  First, the existing empirical studies are restricted to a subset of academic 
programs, most commonly engineering, so the heterogeneity of policy effects in different careers 
has still not been investigated.  More importantly, the AAPs practiced by Indian colleges follow 
government regulations that require that a certain share of positions must be reserved for 
disadvantaged castes in all public institutions within a same state (Bertrand, Hanna, & 
Mullainathan, 2010).  Therefore, in the Indian setting, the AAPs adopted by different public 
universities are mostly homogeneous, limiting the empirical investigation of the differences in 
outcomes of distinct types of policies. 
2.1.2    AAPs for college admission in Brazil 
Brazil was the destination of approximately half of all enslaved individuals brought to the 
Americas during the Atlantic Slave Trade.  It was the last Western country to abolish slavery, and 
consequently, it is still one of the most unequal societies in the world.35  One of the main 
mechanisms through which the institution of slavery leads to long-term impacts on income 
inequality is through human capital accumulation (Bertocchi & Dimico, 2014).  Despite this 
historical background of slavery and an extreme level of socioeconomic inequality, Brazil only 
started adopting AAPs in the early 2000s, about 40 years after the USA and a century later than 
the first Indian reservation policies.    
                                                 
35 A recent economic literature has been devoted to identify the long term impacts of slavery on inequality, including  (Bertocchi 
& Dimico, 2014), (Soares, Assunção, & Goulart, 2012), (Fujiwara, Laudares, & Caicedo, 2017). 
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The pioneering experience with AAP for college admission in Brazil was the Program of 
Quotas at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), which was introduced in 2003 and 
reserved 45% of the university positions for PHSS, Blacks, Indígenas, and students with physical 
disabilities.  In 2004, the National University of Brasília (UNB) became the first federal 
university36 to introduce an AAP for selecting its students.  It established a system of quotas 
reserving 20% of its positions for Black applicants.  In the following years, several other public 
institutions created their own set of AAPs, and by the end of that decade, most federal universities 
had adopted some type of AAP in their admission processes.   
In 2012, the Brazilian federal government passed a new law which led to an unprecedented 
expansion in the use of AAP for college admission in the country.37  Like in the Indian case, the 
Law of Quotas limited the heterogeneity of AAPs in Brazilian federal universities as all institutions 
were obligated to follow the AAP rules imposed by the Law.  However, the analyses presented in 
this paper cover the period that goes from the first experiences with AAP in the early 2000s to 
before the Approval of the Law of Quotas in 2012.  During this period, Brazilian federal 
universities were allowed to define their own set of AAPs, including the alternative of not adopting 
any AAP at all. 
Because the Brazilian experience with AAPs for college admission is relatively recent, the 
empirical literature investigating the impacts of these policies is still narrower than in the case of 
the USA or India.  With respect to the policy effects on the enrollment of targeted students, most 
studies are restricted to the outcomes of specific university experiences.  Examples of such studies 
include Cicalò (2008), Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2011), Aranha, Pena, & Ribeiro (2012), and 
Estevan, Gall, & Morin (2016), each investigating the outcomes of AAPs adopted in different 
Brazilian public universities. 
Cicalò (2008) studied the case of UERJ, observing that the number of policy beneficiaries 
enrolled in the university had consistently decreased after the adoption of AAP for students’ 
                                                 
36 Brazilian Higher Education Institutions can be divided into two main categories, public and private.  Public Universities are  most 
commonly tuition free, and in 2004 they accounted for 28% of Brazilian students in tertiary education.  Public Universities can 
be further separated into three groups: federal, state and municipal institutions, respectively accounting for 48.8%, 40.0% and 
11.2% of student in public institutions (INEP, 2005). 
37 The national Law of Quotas specified that all federal universities should reserve, by 2016, half of its undergraduate positions 
to applicants from disadvantaged groups, including PHSS, Blacks, Indígenas and lower income individuals.  The law required 
universities to start reserving its positions in 2013, with a gradually increasing quota share up to 2016.    
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admission, particularly in less competitive careers.  The author argues that the policy may have 
saturated the demand of targeted groups for less prestigious programs. 
Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2011) examined the case of UNB, which reserved 20% of 
undergraduate positions to candidates who self-declared as Blacks.38  Their analysis indicates that 
the share Pretos and Pardos increased after the policy adoption.  Additionally, they identify that 
students selected through the system of quotas were more likely to come from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds than displaced applicants.  Importantly, their study revealed that dark-
skinned candidates were more likely to identify themselves as Pretos and Pardos when compared 
to the period before the implementation of AAP, indicating that at least part of the policy ef fect 
could be attributed to a shift in the racial self-classification of students. 
Aranha, Pena, & Ribeiro (2012) studied the policy of Bonus adopted by the Federal 
University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in 2009.  The policy granted 10% additional points on the 
entrance exam score of PHSS students applying to UFMG.  Moreover, an additional 5% bonus 
was given to PHSS students who identified themselves as Blacks .  Comparing students who 
enrolled in the university before and after the policy adoption, the authors show that the share of 
Blacks and PHSS in each academic program was statistically lower than the share of applicants 
from each of those groups before AAP.  After the policy was implemented, the shares of Blacks 
and PHSS enrolled at UFMG became equivalent to the shares of applicants. 
More recently, Estevan, Gall, & Morin (2016) investigated the adoption of a similar system 
of bonus at UNICAMP.  The study followed university applicants before and after the policy 
adoption.  Their results show a substantial increase in the enrollment of PHSS and students from 
lower-income households.  However, although the policy included a specific bonus for Blacks, the 
enrollment of students from that group did not change significantly.  Moreover, similarly to Card 
& Krueger (2005), the authors do not observe additional behavioral adjustments of applicants due 
to the policy, neither in terms of vestibular performance nor in terms of application decisions.  
                                                 
38 To become eligible for the system of quotas, students were required to self-identify their race.  However, UnB was one of the 
few universities who introduced a verification system on top of that declaration.  Candidates selected for admission under th e 
system of quota were analyzed by a university commission, which was supposed to confirm the race of the candidate.  This 
commission got national attention from the media when in 2007 a pair of identical twins were differently classified , one as Black 




Going beyond the evaluation of a single university experience, Lopes (2016) investigated 
the distribution of AAP beneficiaries across different academic majors in Brazilian public 
universities.  The study indicates that policy beneficiaries were generally enrolled in lower-prestige 
programs (defined in terms of average post-graduation earnings).  Although the paper investigates 
a large set of universities, the analysis is restricted to cross-sectional observations of academic 
programs.  Therefore, the author did not evaluate the impacts of AAP in the selection of students 
from AAP targeted groups. 
To the extent of our knowledge, no other study has yet analyzed the overall impacts of the 
introduction of AAPs in all Brazilian federal universities.  The examination of individual 
university experiences is important for understanding in-depth the specificities of each case.  
However, the results from these evaluations may be limited because they do not account for 
unobserved factors that may be concomitant with the adoption of AAP in each university.  For 
example, the fact that UERJ observed a saturation of applicants from disadvantaged groups may 
not be completely explained by the university adoption of AAP as suggested by Cicalo (2012).  
Instead, the expansion of private universities and the government programs to finance tuitions and 
fees in those institutions may have also played an important role in reducing the demand for 
applications to some programs at UERJ.  By comparing the profile of students admitted to 
universities that adopted AAPs with those admitted to universities that did not, we are able to 
account for time-specific unobservables that could confound the analyses based solely on an 
individual university’s policy experience. 
Moreover, by analyzing universities that adopted policies with different target groups, we 
are able to compare the outcomes of distinct types of AAP.  One of the most controversial aspects 
of AAPs is the provision of a benefit based on race or skin color of individuals.  Therefore, 
understanding the differences in outcomes between race-conscious and race-blind AAPs is 
extremely important to inform the policy debate.  In the period we analyze in our study, 34 
universities adopted some type of AAP.  However, only 20 of these universities included race as 
an eligibility criterion for their policy.39  The remaining 14 universities adopted AAPs that defined 
                                                 
39 Out of these 20 universities, 17 had included both PHSSs and Blacks as AAP beneficiaries, and only 3 universities adopted AAPs 
targeting exclusively Black students 
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all PHSSs as beneficiaries, regardless of their race or ethnicity. Therefore, while we can classify 
the first group as race-conscious policies, the second group we classify as race-blind AAPs. 
The fact that most Brazilian Universities targeted PHSS within their AAPs can be 
explained by the institutional segregation of students in Brazilian primary and secondary 
education.  Public schools are free of charge at all levels of education; however, the quality of 
public primary and secondary schools is on average inferior when compared to their private 
counterparts.  Moreover, enrollment in private secondary schools is strongly associated with higher 
income and socioeconomic status of households.  Therefore, the type of secondary education is an 
easily identifiable indicator of lower socioeconomic background in Brazil, which is unlikely to be 
manipulated and is less subject to the controversies associated with racial identification and race-
based favoring.40  However, the statistical overlap between race and income may not guarantee 
that race-blind policies could be as effective as race-conscious policies in terms of improving the 
access of racial minorities.  For instance, Darity, Deshpande and Weisskopf (2011) argue that 
class-based AAPs are inherently less effective than group-based policies to improve the access of 
discriminated groups, particularly when access to opportunities is based on some type of 
performance.  However, the magnitude of this policy differential in the case of Brazilian colleges 
is ultimately an empirical question.  Therefore, we take advantage of the fact that AAPs in our 
dataset were heterogeneous in terms of eligibility criteria to investigate whether there were any 
significant differences between the outcomes of race-blind and race-conscious policies, 
particularly with respect to the enrollment of racial minorities. 
2.2    Data 
2.2.1    Timeline of AAP adoption in Brazilian Federal Universities 
Before the approval of the Law of Quotas in 2012, Brazilian federal universities had 
flexibility to define their own set of admission policies.  In 2004, UNB became the first federal 
university to introduce an AAP for selecting its students, and in the following years other Brazilian 
                                                 
40  For a detailed review of this topic, we refer to Daflon, Júnior, & Campos (2013). 
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universities adopted their own set of AAPs.  To identify the moment of adoption and the exact 
policies implemented by each university, we collected information from university councils’ 
minutes and admission process notices41 from the period of 2004 to 2012.42 
From these documents, we constructed the timeline of AAP adoption by Brazilian federal 
universities, which is presented in Table 2.1.  Moreover, we were also able to identify the exact 
admission rules adopted by each institution.  Appendix A details the admission policies of each 
federal University included in our study, and Table 2.2 summarizes the heterogeneity of policies 
with respect to their target groups, indicating the total number of universities that adopted Race-
Blind or Race-Conscious AAP in the period. 
  
2.2.2    ENADE 
 
For the period covered in our analysis, there is not an available database with the characteristics 
of students enrolled in Brazilian public universities.  Therefore, to identify the effects of AAP, we 
explore data from ENADE, a yearly exam conducted by the Brazilian National Government which 
is mandatory for students matriculated at federal universities.43  The exam was created in 2004 
with the objective of accessing the quality of tertiary education in the country.  Students taking 
ENADE are required to fill out a socioeconomic form that includes questions about household 
socioeconomic characteristics and students’ educational background.  We use this self -reported 
information to tabulate the profile of students enrolled in the academic programs of Brazilian 
federal universities in the period of our analysis.  The main variables used in our study include the 
race of students, household income, parents’ education, gender, whether the student attended a  
public or private secondary school, and scores on the ENADE exam. 
                                                 
41  In Portuguese, these documents are referred as “Editais de Chamada dos Processos Vestibulares”. 
42 The documents used to construct our timeline of affirmative action adoption by Brazilian federal universities are available at: 
     http://rsvieira.com/projects/AA/timeline_documents/AA_adoption_documents.zip  
43  State universities are not required to participate in ENADE, although most of them join it voluntarily.  A notable exception is 
the University of São Paulo, Brazilian largest public university, which did not participate in the exam until 2016.  
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Table 2.1: Brazilian Federal Universities by Year of AAP Adoption (2004-2013) 
 
 
University 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
UnB x x x x x x x x x x
UFAL x x x x x x x x x
UFBA x x x x x x x x x
UFPE x x x x x x x x x
UFPR x x x x x x x x x
UFRPE x x x x x x x x x
UFT x x x x x x x x x
Unifesp x x x x x x x x x
UFJF x x x x x x x x
UFPA x x x x x x x x
UFABC x x x x x x x
UFMA x x x x x x x
UFPI x x x x x x x
UFRN x x x x x x x
UFES x x x x x x
UFF x x x x x x
Ufop x x x x x x
UFRGS x x x x x x
UFSC x x x x x x
UFSCar x x x x x x
UFSM x x x x x x
UTFPR x x x x x x
UFG x x x x x
UFMG x x x x x
UFTM x x x x x
UFRRJ x x x x
UFS x x x x
UFSJ x x x x
Univasf x x x x
URG x x x x
UFPB x x x
UFRJ x x x


















Table 2.2: Types of APPs Adopted by Brazilian Federal Universities (2004-2010) 
 
Our main goal is to identify the characteristics of students enrolled in each academic 
program and how they changed after the adoption of AAP.  To answer this question, we restrict 
the total sample of students who took ENADE to freshmen from federal universities in academic 
programs that were observed in at least two different rounds of ENADE.  Until 2010, the exam 
was taken both by students in the first and final years of selected academic programs.  However, 
in 2011, the examination of freshmen was discontinued, so our analysis is restricted to the period 
of 2004 to 2010.  Hence, our final sample includes 170,555 freshmen students who took the 
ENADE exam between 2004 and 2010.  These students were enrolled in 965 academic programs 
from 47 different federal universities,  44 and the median cohort in our sample had 54 students.  
Table 2.3 presents additional descriptive statistics of the sample of students included in our 
analysis. 
It is worth noticing that the ENADE exam does not include all academic programs every 
year; instead, the exam is divided in cycles of three years.  Academic majors45 are divided into 
three different groups, and each group is evaluated every three years.46  Therefore, because the 
sample of freshmen is restricted to the period of 2004 to 2010, we can only observe each university-
program in either two or three rounds of the exam. Table 2.4 shows the academic majors included 
in each round of ENADE between 2004 and 2010, indicating the number of freshmen students 
                                                 
44 UFABC only started participating at ENADE in 2011 http://www.ufabc.edu.br/noticias/alunos-da-ufabc-farao-a-prova-do-
enade-pela-1o-vez. 
45  In Brazilian universities, students select their majors when they apply to the university.  In most cases, if a student decides to 
change major after starting a program, he or she needs to retake the university entrance exam.  
46  For example, medicine programs were evaluated in 2004, 2007 and 2010. 
Universities Ratio
Federal Universities 48 100.0%
Adopted AAPs 34 70.8%
Race-Blind Policies 14 29.2%
Race-Consious Policies 20 41.7%
Without AAPs 14 29.2%
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from federal universities taking the exam every year.47  In the next section, we detail our empirical 
model, presenting the main results and addressing potential limitations of our analysis.  
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics – Freshmen from Federal Universities (ENADE 2004-2010) 
 
                                                 
47 Appendix B shows the total number of observations by year and by federal university. 
obs. sharea obs. sharea
48 100%
965 100%
median cohort size 54 -
170,555 100% 170,555 100%
Branco 63,136 60.3% None 2,346 2.2%
Preto 6,653 6.4% 4th grade 13,885 13.3%
Pardo 32,160 30.7% 8th grade 12,485 11.9%
Amarelo 1,677 1.6% Secondary 36,729 35.1%
Indígena 1,141 1.1% Higher 39,260 37.5%
Blackb 38,813 37.0% NAc 65,850 38.6%
NAc 65,788 38.6%
Sex
All public 41,989 40.0% Female 88,418 51.8%
Partial 11,114 10.6% Male 82,137 48.2%
All private 51,741 49.4%
NAc 65,711 38.5%
Notes: a Shares are calculated excluding observations with no information available (NAs)
b Blacks include the sum of Pretos  and Pardos











Table 2.4: ENADE’s Sample of Freshmen from Federal Universities by Academic Major (2004-
2010) 
 
Major 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Group 1
Medicine 1,544 - - 1,527 - - 4,821 7,879
Nursing 1,202 - - 1,595 - - 3,658 6,511
Agronomy 1,315 - - 1,836 - - 3,774 6,558
Pharmacy 1,083 - - 1,073 - - 2,758 5,139
Social Services 1,097 - - 1,054 - - 2,573 5,038
Veterinary 710 - - 1,198 - - 2,440 4,192
Dentistry 787 - - 948 - - 2,270 4,084
Nutrition 678 - - 904 - - 1,820 3,635
Zootechnics 610 - - 1,251 - - 1,771 3,560
Kinesiology 1,382 - - 1,610 - - 1,407 4,730
Physiotherapy 296 - - 293 - - 776 1,774
Speech Therapy 157 - - 119 - - 259 789
Group 2
Engineering - 8,052 - - 13,127 - - 20,666
Pedagogy - 2,403 - - 4,396 - - 7,009
Language - 3,369 - - 4,033 - - 7,333
Biology - 1,603 - - 3,922 - - 5,464
Mathematics - 2,122 - - 3,262 - - 5,543
Chemistry - 1,495 - - 2,977 - - 4,502
Computer Science - 1,583 - - 2,631 - - 4,335
Physics - 1,674 - - 2,683 - - 4,317
History - 1,934 - - 2,483 - - 4,414
Geography - 1,190 - - 1,844 - - 3,380
Social Sciences - 1,182 - - 1,635 - - 2,952
Philosophy - 756 - - 996 - - 2,076
Architecture - 510 - - 1,005 - - 1,665
Group 3
Business - - 2,633 - - 8,207 - 11,098
Law - - 2,245 - - 5,953 - 8,289
Economics - - 2,016 - - 4,195 - 6,452
Accounting - - 1,773 - - 4,305 - 5,959
Social Communication - - 1,674 - - 2,530 - 4,327
Psychology - - 1,261 - - 2,317 - 3,604
Music - - 742 - - 1,720 - 2,909
Library science - - 1,134 - - 1,731 - 2,987
Tourism - - 605 - - 964 - 1,741
Design - - 513 - - 1,011 - 1,687
Dramaturgy - - 536 - - 812 - 1,533
Executive Secretariat - - 218 - - 271 - 594
Other
Biomedicine - - 279 276 - - 616 1,257
* Does not include tecnology programs
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2.3    Empirical Model and Results 
The goal of our analysis is to identify how AAPs changed the characteristics of students 
enrolled in academic programs.  The key for our identification strategy is the time heterogeneity 
in the adoption of AAP in each Brazilian federal university in the period of our analysis.  Using a 
differences-in-differences strategy, we compute the changes in the average characteristics of 
freshmen students in each academic program of our sample.  The policy effects are then calculated 
as the average difference in those changes between programs from universities that adopted AAP 
and those that did not adopt any policy. 
2.3.1    Baseline Model 
We start our empirical analysis by defining a baseline model that estimates the average 
policy effect in all programs that adopted AAP in the period.  However, because each academic 
program is only observed once every three years, we separate observations into two cycles of three 
years each.  The first cycle includes students who took the exam in 2005, 2006 and 2007,48 and 
the second cycle includes observations from 2008, 2009 and 2010.  With this setup, each academic 
program is observed twice and our baseline empirical model can be described by the following 
equation: 
𝑦𝑝𝑡   =   𝛼𝑝   + ( 𝛽 +   𝛾 𝐸𝑇𝑝   +   𝛿 𝐿𝑇𝑝 ) ∙ 𝑇𝑡   +   𝑝𝑡  (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑝𝑡 is either the log of the share of students with a certain characteristic – Black, 
public high-school, parents with primary education attainment, or female – or the average 
normalized ENADE score of each university-program49 cohort 𝑝.  The coefficient 𝛼𝑝 is a 
university-program fixed effect that does not vary on time, and it captures the average 
characteristics of students in each program in the first cycle.  The variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is an indicator for 
                                                 
48  In the baseline model, we exclude the observations from 2004.  By doing that, all academic programs are observed in the same 
number of periods.  If instead, we had part of the observations with three periods and part with two, we would need to 
estimate an additional set of coefficients that would be specific for the former group, hindering the interpretation of results.  
In Session III.B we use the group of programs observed in three different years to test for pre-treatment parallel trends. 
49  A university program is defined as an academic major from a specific university.  For example, the program of Law at UnB.  
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observations from the second cycle of exams, that is, it takes the value of 1 for observations of 
students who took the exam in 2008, 2009 and 2010, and takes the value of zero otherwise:  
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡   =   0        𝑖𝑓        𝑡   ∈   (2005, 2006, 2007) 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡   =   1        𝑖𝑓        𝑡   ∈   (2008, 2009, 2010) 
(2) 
Therefore, the coefficients 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝛿 compose the average changes of student 
characteristics when comparing the second to the first cycle.  While 𝛽 is the average change 
observed throughout all academic programs, 𝛾 is specific for programs that adopted AAP in the 
first cycle, that is, the Early Treatment (𝐸𝑇) group.  Similarly, 𝛿 is the equivalent coefficient for 
the Late Treatment (𝐿𝑇) group, which are the programs which had no AAP during the first cycle 
but had adopted it in the second cycle.  Programs without any AAP in neither the first or second 
cycles are defined as Controls (𝐶𝑜).  Therefore, the average change of student characteristics is 
calculated by different coefficient compositions for each group of programs.  While for the 𝐶𝑜 
group the average change is given by 𝛽, for the 𝐸𝑇 group it is given by 𝛽 + 𝛾 and for the 𝐿𝑇 group it 
is given by 𝛽 + 𝛿.  Therefore, the coefficient 𝛿 can be interpreted as the average treatment effect of 
AAP adoption if we assume that  𝛽 corresponds to the counterfactual change that would be 
expected if the Late Treatment universities had not adopted any AAP.50 
As for the dependent variables used in our models, we investigate a series of different 
student characteristics that include: race, type of secondary school, socioeconomic background, 
gender, and the score at the ENADE exam.  In the case of race, our main variable is an indicator 
of Blacks, which is the pooling of students who self-classify as either Preto or Pardo.  For the type 
of secondary school, we focus on students who report completing all of their secondary education 
in public-schools. 
With respect to the socioeconomic background, we define as an indicator of lower-strata 
the students who report that their parents have not studied beyond primary education.  51  It is well 
established in the economic literature that education attainment is closely associated with income 
and wealth. 
                                                 
50  Similarly, the coefficient 𝛾 can be interpreted as a lagged effect of AAP on the Early Treatment group. 
51 That is, the indicator only takes a value of one if neither the mother nor the father have studied beyond primary education. 
20.8% of students in our sample have both parents with no more than primary education attainment. 
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We also analyze the share of female students in each program to verify whether the 
expansion of AAP was associated with any indirect effect in the enrollment of women in tertiary 
education.52  And finally, we also evaluate changes in average ENADE scores of students in each 
program.53 
Table 2.5 shows the regression results for this baseline model specification where the 
treatment effect is pooled across all academic careers and types of AAP.  The main coefficient of 
interest in each regression is the interaction between observations from the second period and late 
treatment universities (𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡), which corresponds to coefficient 𝛿 in Equation 
2.  These coefficients can be interpreted as the average changes in the dependent variables for 
universities that adopted AAP compared to the changes observed in the control group.  The results 
show that the share of Blacks, PHSS and Low-Education Parents increased significantly more for 
programs that adopted AAPs compared to the control group.  The increase in the enrollment of 
Blacks was 8.8p.p. higher on treated universities if compared to the average change observed on 
the control programs (6.5%).  Meanwhile the increase in the share of PHSS was 16.4p.p., and 
students with low-education 12.2p.p. above the respective increases on the controls.  These results 
confirm that, on average, the groups targeted by the AAPs had a positive and significant enrollment 
gain in treated programs if compared to programs from universities that did not adopt any type of 
AAP. 
No significant effects were observed associating the adoption of AAP with the share of 
women or the average ENADE score of students. A major criticism of AAP is that it could lead to 
the selection of poorly prepared students, causing a reduction in the overall quality of programs.  
However, in line with most of the empirical literature investigating this question, we do not observe 
any significant changes in the ENADE score of students from universities after they adopted AAP.  
Although ENADE is limited as a measure of academic abilities, an interesting aspect of our result 
is that all students included in our sample are freshmen, so the similarity in performance between 
                                                 
52  Bertrand, Hanna, & Mullainathan (2010) reported that caste-based AAPs in India led to a reduction in the overall number of 
females entering engineering colleges. 
53  While we are aware of the limitations of the ENADE score as a measure of student abilities, we include this estimation in our 
analysis so we can compare our results with previous findings in the literature of AAP mismatch hypothesis.   Only for this 
variable, the dependent variable cannot be calculated as the log of the share per cohort, so instead we compute the normalized 
average score per cohort.  
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treated and untreated groups cannot be explained by AAP beneficiaries catching up to non-
beneficiaries during the college years. 
As for the other coefficients estimated by our model, the results indicate that for the Early 
Treatment group, the share of PHSS also grew by approximately 18.2% during the second period 
of our analysis, a result that contradicts the concern of a possible saturation in the demand for 
public higher education from disadvantaged students as raised by Cicalo (2008), at least in the 
initial years after the adoption of AAP. 
Table 2.5: OLS Regression -  Changes in The Profile of Enrolled Students by AAP Adoption 
 
 
  Late AAP Adopter e  ×  Post g 0.088 ** 0.164 *** 0.122 * 0.014 -0.001
(0.031) (0.035) (0.049) (0.019) (0.037)
  Early AAP Adopter f  ×  Post -0.002 0.182 *** 0.080 -0.025 0.060
(0.033) (0.038) (0.053) (0.021) (0.041)
  Post 0.065 ** 0.070 ** -0.007 0.065 *** -0.002
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.013) (0.028)
Program FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,900 1,944 1,760 2,032 730
Adjusted R2 0.855 0.734 0.757 0.888 0.419
notes:
  Coefficients can be interpreted as relative changes.  E.g., a coefficient of 0.5 indicates an increase of 50%
g Post: dummy indicating the second cycle of ENADE exams (2008, 2009 and 2010)
e Late AAP Adopter:  Programs which had no AAP in 2005-2007, but adopted it in 2008-2010
f Early AAP Adopter:  Programs which adopted AAP in 2005-2007
*p<0.05,  **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001.
a Black: refers to the combined group of Pretos and Pardos
b PHSS: Public High School Student (all years)
c Low-educ parents: none of the student's parents have studied beyond primary education










Finally, it is also interesting to notice the overall changes of student characteristics which 
are described by the coefficient for 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 only.  These results indicate positive and significant 
average changes in the shares of Blacks, PHSSs and women, even on programs where AAP was 
not adopted.  These results highlight the importance of comparing the changes of programs that 
adopted AAP with other programs in order to avoid overestimating the treatment effects of AAP. 
2.3.2    Heterogeneous Effect by Program Competitiveness 
An important question about the effectiveness of AAPs relates to the heterogeneity of the 
policy impact with respect to programs’ prestige.  The literature based on the American experience 
indicates that AAP effects are usually restricted to top tier institutions. Meanwhile the policies 
seem to have negligible effects in less prestigious programs (Epple, Romano, & Sieg, 2008), 
(Long, 2004), (Arcidiacono, 2005), Hinrichs (2012), (Backes, 2012).  However, with respect to 
the Brazilian experience, the existing results from the literature are not yet clear.  While AAP 
beneficiaries seem to be more concentrated in less prestigious academic programs (Cicalò, 2008), 
(Lopes, 2016), there is yet no evidence on how the expansion of AAPs has changed the enrollment 
of disadvantaged students in academic programs with different levels of competitiveness for 
admission.   
To investigate this question, we estimate an extended version of our baseline model where 
we interact the treatment effect of AAP with a measure of program competitiveness (𝐶𝑝𝑗): 
𝑦𝑝𝑡   =   𝛼𝑝   + ∑ (( 𝛽𝑗  +   𝛾𝑗 𝐸𝑇𝑝   +   𝛿𝑗 𝐿𝑇𝑝) ∙ 𝑇𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑝𝑗 )
𝑗
  +   𝑝𝑡 (3) 
Differently from the baseline model, the coefficients 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are disaggregated for 
programs with different levels of competitiveness 𝑗.  It is important to notice that we define the 
competitiveness of each program based on their corresponding minimum score for general 
admission in 2016.54  Based on this metric, we separate programs into three categories: low-, 
                                                 
54 The minimum score for admission for each program was taken from SISU, which is a unified system of student admission for 
Brazilian universities that was established in 2010.  We use the SISU cutoff score from 2016 for defining program 
competitiveness for two main reasons: 1) although the system was created in 2010, the adoption of SISU by federal universities 
was gradual, therefore the match between the programs participating in SISU and the programs in the ENADE dataset is higher 
for the most recent available year.  2)  The minimum SISU score for each program before 2016 could be associated with the 
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medium- and high-competitiveness.55  We divide the programs into 3 quantiles, so the cutoff scores 
for each group are defined at 645 and 700 points, leading the indicator variables 𝐶𝑝𝑗 to be defined 
as: 
𝐶𝑝,𝑙𝑜𝑤   =   1        𝑖𝑓        𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑝 < 645                 
𝐶𝑝,𝑙𝑜𝑤   =   0                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                       
 
𝐶𝑝,𝑚𝑒𝑑   =   1        𝑖𝑓        645 < 𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑝 < 700 
𝐶𝑝,𝑚𝑒𝑑   =   0                     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                   
                 
𝐶𝑝,ℎ𝑖𝑔   =   1        𝑖𝑓        700 < 𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑝                  
𝐶𝑝,ℎ𝑖𝑔   =   0                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                      
(4) 
 
  Figure 2.1 shows the histogram of the SISU 2016 minimum score for the academic 
programs included in our analysis and how they relate to the competitiveness categories we have 
just defined.  Table 2.6 shows the results for the regressions where we interacted the original 
treatment groups with an indicator of competitiveness for each academic program as described by 
Equation 3: 
Overall, the results indicate that the effects of AAP adoption were larger and mostly 
restricted to the more competitive programs.  In the group of programs identified as highly-
competitive, the shares of Blacks, PHSS, and students with low-educated parents increased 
respectively by 19.6, 39.7 and 30.5 percentage points above the corresponding changes on the 
control programs.  Meanwhile, the average changes on low-competitive programs were roughly 
negligible and statistically not different from zero.  In the case of medium-competitive programs, 
point estimates were slightly larger, but still not significant. 
Additionally, we have not observed any significant association between the adoption of 
AAP and changes in the gender composition of cohorts in none of the competitiveness groups 
included in our analysis. 
                                                 
adoption of AAPs before the Law of Quotas, hence confounding competitiveness with different levels of quotas.  However, by 
2016, the AAP rules of all federal universities were mostly homogenized due to the Law of Quotas. 
55 Appendix F presents the competitiveness model estimation results using alternative definitions of program competitiveness 
groups.  While we lose precision by adding additional competitiveness groups, the overall results remain mostly the same, with 
larger effects observed on programs with higher SISU 2016 scores. 
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Table 2.6: OLS Regression - Changes in the Characteristics of Enrolled Students 
by AAP Adoption and Program Competitiveness 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Histogram of Minimum SISU Score for General Admission in 2016  
Federal University Programs included in the ENADE exams of 2004-2010 
  Low-Compet.g  ×  LT AAP e  ×  Post f 0.021 0.017 0.081 -0.049 0.227
(0.079) (0.092) (0.120) (0.048) (0.141)
  Medium-Compet.  ×  LT AAP  ×  Post 0.106 0.044 0.009 0.051 -0.040
(0.060) (0.069) (0.093) (0.037) (0.083)
  High-Compet.  ×  LT AAP  ×  Post 0.196 *** 0.392 *** 0.305 *** 0.016 0.024
(0.057) (0.066) (0.092) (0.036) (0.059)
Program FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,384 1,412 1,294 1,476 456
Adjusted R2 0.871 0.759 0.776 0.900 0.397
notes:
  Coefficients can be interpreted as relative changes.  E.g., a coefficient of 0.5 indicates an increase of 50%
  For consiseness, we ommit the coefficients for the interactions between competitiveness, ET and Co programs.
  Appendix C reports the whole set of coefficients estimated from this model.
g Program competitivenss was defined based on the minimum SISU score of 2016.  For details, see Figure 1.
*p<0.05,  **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001.










Once again, we found no significant effects of the adoption of AAP on the performance of 
students at the ENADE exam, even in the case of highly-competitive programs.  This result is 
particularly strong against the mismatch hypothesis since these are the programs where one would 
expect a larger gap between beneficiaries and their peers.  Although we believe this is an 
interesting result, it should be viewed with caution due to the limitations of ENADE as a metric 
for students’ performance.  Further research with better metrics would be required for a properly 
examining this question. 
In synthesis, the results from this analysis indicate that the effects of AAPs on improving 
the enrollment of students from disadvantaged backgrounds in Brazil were mostly concentrated on 
the high-competitive programs, a result that is in line with what was previously found in the 
American experiences with AAP. 
 
2.3.3    Race-Blind vs Race-Conscious Policies 
 
We now investigate the effectiveness of race-blind policies to indirectly improve the access 
of racially discriminated groups to college in Brazil.  We classify the AAPs adopted by the 
universities in our sample as race-blind (𝑅𝐵) if they do not include race or ethnicity as an eligibility 
criterion and race-conscious (𝑅𝐶) if they do.  We then estimate the following extension of our 
baseline model: 
𝑦𝑝𝑡   =   𝛼𝑝   + (𝛽 +   𝛾𝑅𝐵 𝐸𝑇_𝑅𝐵𝑝 + 𝛾𝑅𝐶  𝐸𝑇_𝑅𝐶𝑝   +   𝛿𝑅𝐵 𝐿𝑇_𝑅𝐵𝑝 + 𝛿𝑅𝐶  𝐿𝑇_𝑅𝐶𝑝) ∙ 𝑇𝑡  +  𝑝𝑡  (4) 
 Here, each treatment group (𝐸𝑇 and 𝐿𝑇) are further divided into race-blind (RB) or race-
conscious (𝑅𝐶).  The interpretation of coefficients mostly mirrors the baseline model.  However, 
within this specification, the main question is the existence of differences between 𝛿𝑅𝐶 and 𝛿𝑅𝐵, that 
is, the LT specific average changes in the profile of students after the adoption of AAP, particularly 
in the case of dependent variables associated with racial characteristics. 
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Table 2.7: OLS Regression - Changes in the Characteristics of Enrolled Students 
by AAP Adoption and by Type of AAP (Race-Blind vs. Race-Conscious) 
 
 
Table 2.7 presents the results of this estimation.  Given that we’ve found the effects of 
AAPs to be mostly concentrated on highly competitive programs, we estimate this model with two 
sets of data, A) pooling all programs from our dataset; B) restricting the sample to the highly-
competitive programs only. 
A: All Programs
    Race Blind g AAP LT e ×  Post f -0.028 0.122 * -0.010 0.020 -0.017
(0.041) (0.048) (0.065) (0.025) (0.056)
    Race Conscious h AAP LT ×  Post 0.169 *** 0.191 *** 0.214 *** 0.010 0.004
(0.036) (0.041) (0.057) (0.022) (0.040)
    Post 0.065 ** 0.070 ** -0.007 0.065 *** -0.002
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.013) (0.028)
  Program FE yes yes yes yes yes
  Observations 1,900 1,944 1,760 2,032 730
  Adjusted R2 0.858 0.734 0.761 0.889 0.416
B:  High-Competitive Programs Only
    Race Blind AAP LT ×  Post 0.035 0.217 * 0.162 0.040 -0.057
(0.092) (0.102) (0.141) (0.047) (0.102)
    Race Conscious AAP LT ×  Post 0.271 *** 0.475 *** 0.376 ** 0.005 0.047
(0.074) (0.082) (0.116) (0.038) (0.066)
    Post -0.004 -0.184 ** -0.263 ** 0.044 -0.008
(0.052) (0.058) (0.084) (0.027) (0.046)
  Program FE yes yes yes yes yes
  Observations 438 444 372 470 212
  Adjusted R2 0.873 0.767 0.740 0.926 0.461
notes:
  Coefficients can be interpreted as relative changes.  E.g., a coefficient of 0.5 indicates an increase of 50%
  For concieness, we ommit the coefficients associated with early treatment programs.    
  Appendix C reports the whole set of coefficients estimated in this model.
g Race Blind: AAPs without any race specific eligibility criteria.  In all of or cases eligibility was granted to PHSS
h Race Conscious: AAPs with race specific eligibility criteria.  Either exclusive or combined with PHSS status
*p<0.05,  **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001.
a,b,c,d,e,f: see notes from Table 5;
Dependent variable:
Blacka PHSSb Low-educ women ENADE
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The results indicate that race conscious policies were associated with a larger increase of 
Blacks, PHSS and students with low-educated parents if compared to race blind policies.  Not only 
the results were larger, but in the case of the enrolment of Blacks and of people whose parents had 
low-education attainment, the outcomes of race blind AAPs were not statistically different from 
zero.  Even in the case we restrict the analysis to high-competitive programs, the results are still 
the same, that is, race conscious policies are associated with an increase of all types of 
disadvantaged groups, while race blind results are limited to PHSS, with negligible effects in the 
enrollment of Blacks. 
These results suggest an overall ineffectiveness of race blind policies to indirectly increase 
the enrollment of racial minorities.  Although income, type of school and race are strongly 
interconnected attributes in Brazil, AAPs using high-school type as the sole eligibility criteria have 
had no effects on improving the enrollment of Blacks, at least in the programs evaluated in our 
sample.  On the other hand, universities that adopted policies with explicit race-conscious criteria 
significantly increased their shares of Black students.  Moreover, in the case of race-conscious 
policies, we also observed an increase in the enrollment of students whose parents have not 
completed beyond primary education, indicating that race-conscious AAPs were also effective in 
improving the enrollment for of the least wealth individuals of society. 
2.3.4    Empirical Model Limitations and Possibly Confounding Factors 
The main underlying assumption for the validity of our estimates as the causal effect of 
AAP is that in the absence of the policy implementation, the changes that would occur on the 
treated group would be equivalent to changes observed on control universities.  Therefore, there 
are two main threats to the validity of our estimates of the effects of AAPs:  1) the existence  of 
pre-treatment trend differences between universities that adopted or not AAPs; 2) unobserved 
shocks associated with the adoption of AAPs that may have also affected the enrolled of 





2.3.4.1    Pre-treatment trends 
In the case of differences in pre-treatment trends, we could empirically test it if we had at 
least two observations for each academic program before the adoption of AAP by the treatment 
group.  Therefore, in our setting, such data is only available in the case of the academic majors 
included in the Group 1 of ENADE.  These programs were evaluated in 2004, 2007 and 2010.  
Therefore, for this group it is possible to analyze, for each dependent variable, whether paths were 
parallel between 2004 and 2007 for the Control and the Late Treatment groups, that is, universities 
that did not adopt AAP and those which adopted it between 2008 and 2010.  To conduct this test, 
we subset our sample to Group 1 of academic majors and estimate pre-treatment common trends 
using a model with fully flexible group-specific dynamics as described by Mora & Reggio (2017), 
which in our setting, is represented by Equation 5 below: 
𝑦𝑝𝑡 =   𝛼𝑝   +   ( 𝛽2007   +   𝛾2007𝐸𝑇𝑝   +  𝛿2007𝐿𝑇𝑝) ∙ 𝑇𝑡
2007 +  ( 𝛽2010  +   𝛾2010𝐸𝑇𝑝  + 𝛿2010 𝐿𝑇𝑝) ∙ 𝑇𝑡
2010 +   𝑝𝑡  (5) 
Differently from the baseline model, this estimation includes observations from three 
different periods, therefore the indicator variables of time-periods are defined as: 
𝑇𝑡
2007   =   1        𝑖𝑓        𝑡 =   2007  
𝑇𝑡
2007   =   0       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒              
 
𝑇𝑡
2010   =   1        𝑖𝑓        𝑡 =   2010  
𝑇𝑡
2010   =   0        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒              
(6) 
Again, programs from universities that adopted AAP in 2007 are classified as Early 
Treatment (𝐸𝑇), programs that adopted AAP in 2010 are classified as Late Treatment (𝐿𝑇), and 
programs without any AAP are classified as Controls.56  If common trends existed between Late 
Treatment and Control groups before the adoption of AAP by the former group, then coefficient 
𝛿2007  should not be statistically different from zero for none of our dependent variables.   
Table 2.8 reports the point-estimates of 𝛿2007  for each of the dependent variables included 
in our analysis.  All estimates are not statistically different from zero, therefore we cannot reject 
                                                 
56  Within our sample, besides UNB, no other university had adopted AAP by 2004.  Therefore, to avoid estimating a set of 
coefficients based on a single university, we exclude the observations of students from UNB from this analysis.  
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the assumption of common trends between treated and control universities, at least before the 
adoption of AAPs by the Late Treatment group.  Figure 2.2 shows the results from this exercise 
graphically, where the segments between 2004 and 2007 indicate the pre-treatment trends – which 
are the ones we need to assume are equivalent between LT and Co groups – and the segments from 
2007 and 2010 indicate the group specific trends after AAP adoption by the LT group. 
Although the regression results of interest are not statistically significant, the point estimate 
are negative for the share of Blacks, PHSS and students with low-education parents.  So, if 
anything, those shares were actually decreasing on universities that later adopted AAPs if 
compared to the control group.  Therefore, these results strongly support the interpretation of our 
main results, that is, AAPs had a positive and significant effect on the enrollment of targeted 
groups. 
Table 2.8: OLS Regression – Pre-Trend Differences between Late Treatment and Control 
Groups Before the Adoption of AAP (Group 1 of ENADE Majors) 
 
 
  LT AAP   ×  2007 e -0.099 -0.025 -0.122 0.011 0.046
(0.087) (0.096) (0.130) (0.038) (0.115)
Program FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 660 666 564 705 126
Adjusted R2 0.844 0.753 0.701 0.868 0.179
notes:
  Coefficients can be interpreted as relative changes.  E.g., a coefficient of 0.5 indicates an increase of 50%
  For consiseness, we ommit the coefficients for the interactions between 2007, 2010 and ET.
  Appendix C reports the whole set of coefficients estimated from this model.
e   LT AAP   ×  2007:  Difference in trends between LT goup (Treated in 2010) and Control before treatment.
*p<0.05,  **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001.











Figure 2.2: OLS Regression Results – Trends of Dependent Variables for Late Treatment and 




2.3.4.2    Possibly Contemporaneous Confounding Factors 
The second threat to the validity of our estimates are the possibility of unobserved shocks 
associated with the adoption of AAP by each university that could also affect the selection of 
disadvantaged students.  When comparing public universities with respect to the adoption of AAP, 
Daflon, Júnior, & Campos (2013) find no significant differences in terms of geographical 
distribution57 and academic ranking of universities.  However, other factors with relevant impacts 
on the profile of enrolled students could still be correlated with the adoption of AAPs.  To address 
this issue, we test the association between the adoption of AAP and five possibility confounding 
variables: 1) the expansion of undergraduate positions, 2) the expansion of nearby competing 
private universities, 3) the growth of regional economic activity, 4) the share of black students 
graduating from high school, and 5) the share of high school graduates from public high schools.  
For each of these variables, we estimate their association with the adoption of AAP through the 
following regression model: 
Δ𝑧𝑢𝑡 = 𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑢𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (7) 
Where Δ𝑧𝑢𝑡 is the change in variable z𝑢 between years 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1.  Moreover, 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑢𝑡 is an 
indicator if university 𝑢 had adopted an AAP by year 𝑡.  Finally, 𝜇𝑡 are year fixed effects.  If the 
adoption of AAPs by federal universities were associated with any of the changes in potentially 
confounding variables 𝑧, then coefficient 𝜙 would capture that relationship. 
Additionally, we also explore 3 additional potentially confounding factors that could be 
associated with the ENADE data sampling: 1) the cohort size, 2) students from the night session 
of each program, and 3) missing data from the socioeconomic questionnaire.  For these variables, 
Equation 7 is extended to include Program Fixed Effects as we have data at the student level:  
𝑧𝑖 = 𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝑖 (8) 
                                                 
57 Appendix D shows the map with the location of Brazilian federal universities by AAP treatment status.  
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Table 2.9: OLS Regression - AAP Adoption and Possibly Confounding Variables 
 
Results for the estimation of Equations 7 and 8 are shown in Table 2.9.  The association 
between the adoption of AAP and each of the possibly confounding variables we investigate seems 
to be mostly negligible.  The only significant result is a reduction of approximately 1.5% in the 
share of Blacks taking ENEM in the states where universities adopted AAPs.  Even though the 
magnitude of the association is small, the sign of the coefficient is in the opposite direction to the 
result that would confound our results.  That is, the adoption of AAP does not seem to be associated 
with an increase in the shares of Black students graduating from secondary education or applying 
to college.  If anything, this result indicates that the coefficients we estimate for the effects of 
AAPs adoption in the enrollment of Black students could be downward biased. 
In conclusion, from the analysis carried in this section, we do not observe pre-treatment 
differences between universities that adopted or did not adopt AAPs with respect to our dependent 
variables.  Additionally, we did not find evidence of any association between the adoption of AAP 
and variables that could potentially be associated with the selection of disadvantaged students.  
2.4    Conclusion 
This paper investigated the effects of the adoption of AAPs by Brazilian federal 
universities.  Using a difference-in-differences design, we explored the heterogeneity in the time 
of policy adoption to identify the effects of AAP on the enrollment of students from disadvantaged 
















  AAP 0.012 -0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.015
**
16.7 -0.012 0.001
(0.053) (0.014) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (11.6) (0.019) (0.023)
  Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
  Program FE yes yes yes
Obs 336 336 336 336 336 176,000 176,000 176,000
Adj R
2 0.086 0.144 0.101 0.459 0.698 0.908 0.502 0.115




effective in improving the enrollment of students from groups explicitly targeted by each policy.  
Most universities in our sample adopted rules to favor the selection of students who graduated 
from public high schools or who were self-identified as Blacks, and accordingly, we observed an 
overall increase in the enrollment of students from those groups.   
However, the increase in the enrollment of Blacks was only observed in the academic 
programs from universities that adopted AAPs with explicit racial criteria.  A common argument 
in the debate about affirmative action is that race-blind policies would be preferred because the 
interconnected relationship between race and socioeconomic conditions insure that, policies 
targeting socioeconomically deprived individuals would indirectly benefit racial minorities 
without relying on controversial race-based preferences.  However, we have shown that race-blind 
AAPs have had a negligible effect on the enrollment of Blacks.  Meanwhile, race-conscious 
policies not only were associated with a larger share of admitted Black students, but also had larger 
impacts on the enrollment of individuals with worse socioeconomic characteristics. 
Similar to other results from the international literature, we also observed that the effects 
of AAPs were larger for more competitive programs, while they were mostly negligible for less-
competitive ones.  Moreover, we did not find any evidence of differences in the academic 
performance of students enrolled in programs that adopted AAP nor any differences in their gender 
composition. 
We acknowledge that the main limitation of our study relates to the source of the 
information we have used to identify the characteristics of students in each program.  The 
demographic data from the ENADE exam is limited because it is self-reported and academic 
programs are observed only once every three years.  However, it is the best available source of 
information for the set of students enrolled in the academic programs of Brazilian Federal 
Universities in the period we analyzed in this paper.  Linking the ENADE data with other sources 
of students’ information is a suggested next step for improving the quality and precision of the 
analysis carried in this paper.  Additionally, our analysis is constrained to a single aspect associated 
with the adoption of AAPs.  Further questions on the impacts of these policies in the Brazilian 
context remain unanswered, and include: the graduation rates of beneficiaries, the impacts of 
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Chapter 3: Travel Behavior Effects of 
Fare-Free Public Transportation for the 
Elderly in Brazilian Metropolitan Areas 
This paper investigates how a policy that grants fare-free public transportation for 
the elderly affects the travel behavior of its beneficiaries.  To identify the policy 
impacts, I explore the fact that eligibility for exemption is based on age thresholds 
that vary by gender and by city.  Using data from household travel surveys, I 
estimate the causal effects of free-fare on travel behavior through a Regression 
Discontinuity Design.  The results of my analysis indicate that eligibility for fare-
free public transportation increases transit ridership among beneficiaries in 
approximately 27.3%.  However, I do not find any significant effects of the policy 
on mode substitution nor on trip characteristics. 
Keywords: Fare-Free Public Transportation, Seniors Free Ride 
Subsidies to public transit fares are a common policy throughout the world.  This type of price 
intervention can be economically justified as a second-best mechanism to attenuate the external 
costs associated with the use of private vehicles (Parry & Small, Should Urban Transit Subsidies 
Be Reduced?, 2009).58  However, the effectiveness of such policy depends on the elasticity of 
substitution between private and public modes.  Yet, empirical causal evidence about the 
magnitude of such elasticity is rather limited, particularly in the developing world.  Exogenous 
price shocks, which are key for identifying the slope of the demand curve, are hardly available in 
these markets.  This limitation of information is even more critical in the case of non-marginal 
price changes, which are often suggested as optimal fare policies such as in Parry & Small (2009) 
and Basso & Silva (2014).   
This paper aims to address this gap by providing novel empirical evidence about the 
elasticity of substitution of transport modes given a non-marginal transit fare reduction.  
Specifically, I explore a Brazilian policy that grants fare-free public transportation to senior citizen.  
                                                 
58 As a recent example of this argument, a complete subsidization of transit-fare has been proposed in different German cities with the objective 
of reducing emissions (The Washington Post, 2018). 
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Using a rich dataset of individuals’ travel behavior, I compare the number of trips, by different 
modes, made by individuals who are just above and just below the fare exemption threshold age.  
Though this empirical strategy, I identify the causal impact of a complete fare subsidization on 
individuals’ travel behavior. 
The results of this analysis indicate that fare-free public transportation increases transit 
ridership of beneficiaries by approximately 27.3%.  However, I do not identify any significant 
effects on mode substitution, particularly in the case of trips made by private vehicles. 
Compared to the existing literature on the effects of transit fare subsidies, this study has 
three major differentials:  First, my results are based on ex-post reduced form estimations of policy 
impacts.  Most of the literature evaluating the effects of transit subsidies is based on elasticities 
estimated or inputted from structural models,59 which tend to present more elastic demand curves 
if compared to empirical estimations from reduced form econometric models (Kremers, Nijkamp, 
& Rietveld, 2002).  Second, I explore the effects of a non-marginal fare difference where 
individuals experience mostly identical conditions except for the transit fare.  In the transportation 
literature, elasticities estimated from reduced form models are usually based on before-and-after 
comparisons.60  However concomitant with fare price adjustments, other structural changes are 
usually implemented, thus possibly confounding the effects of price on demand.  Third, my paper 
analyses the effect of complete fare subsidization in a developing world setting, where the mode 
share of public transit is much higher61 than in developed world, and consequently public transit 
policies have a more extensive impact on welfare. 
The results from my analysis may not be directly generalized to other contexts or other 
groups of individuals, however, understanding the outcomes of transit subsidization for the elderly 
in Brazil is an important question on its own.  The Brazilian national constitution requires that 
urban public transportation should be free of charge to all elderly individuals.  So, understanding 
how the policy affects its beneficiaries is important for policy makers in the country, especially 
considering the aging characteristic of the Brazilian population.  Demographic projection indicates 
                                                 
59 Some examples include: (Basso & Silva, 2014), (Tscharaktschiew & Hirte, 2012), (Proost & Dender, 2008), (Parry & Small, 2009) 
60 For example, (Cats, Susilo, & Reimal, 2016), (Rye & Mykura, 2009) 
61 In the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo, more than half of motorized trips are made by public modes, corresponding to more than 16 mill ion 
trips per day (METRO, 2013). 
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that, by 2030, the share of trips made by individuals who are eligible for fare exemption will 
increase by 50.8% (Pereira, Carvalho, Souza, & Camarano, 2015).  Therefore, the government 
expenditure for providing fare-free public transportation to the elderly is expected to increase 
substantially if the existing eligibility rules are not modified.  Compelled by this scenario, policy 
makers are discussing reviewing the eligibility rules for fare exemption.62  So, the results from this 
paper can also be used to inform this policy debate. 
3.1    Background 
3.1.1    Transit Fare Subsidies and the Elasticities of Substitution 
Theoretically, subsidies to the transit fare can be supported as a welfare improving pricing 
strategy (Basso, Guevara, Gschwender, & Fuster, 2011).  Among the rationales for intervening in 
transit the fare, we have that the marginal cost of driving private vehicles does not internalize the 
social costs associated with its use, which include pollution, accidents and congestion.  Therefore, 
subsidizing public transit could act as a second-best solution for these externalities as it creates an 
incentive for drivers to substitute their trips to public modes.63  Given this mechanism, models 
evaluating the optimality of transit fare subsidies commonly identify large amounts of 
subsidization as optimal policies (Basso & Silva, 2014) (Parry & Small, Should Urban Transit 
Subsidies Be Reduced?, 2009). 
However, the effectiveness of this second-best strategy depends on the elasticity of 
substitution between private and public modes.  Although transportation elasticities have been 
extensively investigated by economists, engineers and planners,64 rare are the occasions where 
completely exogenous price chocks are observed, particularly in the case of non-marginal changes 
as the ones corresponding to the large subsidizations recommended by the structural models on 
optimal fare pricing.  Moreover, it has been observed that reduced form estimations of elasticities 
tend to be lower if compared to typical structural models (Kremers, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 2002), 
                                                 
62 See for example, http://goo.gl/yhGZU7. 
63 Transit subsidies can also be theoretically supported based on scale economies relating to fixed costs and the “Mohring effec t” (Parry & Small, 
2009) and economies of density (Elgar & Kennedy, 2005) 
64 Some literature reviews and meta analyses on public transit elasticities include (Litman, 2017), (Kremers, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 2002), (Holmgren, 
2007).  Moreover (Volinski, 2012) reviews the outcomes of fare-free experiments in the USA 
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which might be problematic given the high sensitivity of optimal pricing policies to these 
parameters. 
Within this context, my study aims to explore as a quasi-experiment the Brazilian policy 
that grants fare free public transportation to older adults.  By comparing the travel behavior of 
individuals who are just below and just above the policy threshold I can infer through a regression 
discontinuity (RD) design the causal effect of a total fare subsidization, and thus compare my 
results with traditional elasticity parameters from the literature. 
In recent years, RD designs have become a popular method in applied economics given its 
theoretically capacity of recovering causal effect given considerably mild assumptions.  In a meta-
analysis evaluating the method effectiveness, RD designs have shown not only high performance 
in terms of internal validity but also for the external validity of its results (Chaplin, et al., 2018).  
To the extent of my knowledge, no other study has yet explored this method to identify the causal 
effects of price changes on travel behavior. 
3.1.2    Reduced fare Programs for the Elderly 
Reduced fare programs for the elderly are a common practice worldwide.  National policies 
include the UK concessionary fares and the Brazilian fare-free public transit fare for all individuals 
older than 65.  However, while there is a large literature evaluating the outcomes of the UK policy, 
not many academic papers have been published investigating the Brazilian case. 
Possibly the only exception is Pereira et al. (2015), which estimates the impact of 
population aging on the share of transit trips made by senior individuals eligible for fare exemption 
in São Paulo.  Using demographic projection methods, the authors estimate that the share of transit 
trips made by senior individuals will increase by 126.7% by 2050.  So, according to the authors, 
in order to maintain the current level of subsidization, the transit fare for paying passengers should 
increase by 21% if the current fare-free scheme to the elderly is not changed.   
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The Brazilian Constitution mandates that urban public transportation should be free of 
charge for all individuals above the age of 65.65  This benefit is valid throughout the country and 
cannot be overruled by local regulations.  Moreover, in 1993, the city of São Paulo extended the 
benefit by reducing to 60 the age threshold for fare-free eligibility for women.  In 2013, a similar 
threshold reduction was enacted for the male population.66  Therefore, between 1993 and 2013, 
while women could start riding public transit for free at age 60, men had the same benefit only 
when they turned 65.  It is important to notice that this lower age threshold for women in São Paulo 
was only valid for trips made by municipal buses, which account for 57.4% of all public transit 
trips in the city (METRO, 2013).  In the case of trips made by other public modes such as subway, 
urban trains and metropolitans buses, the fare exemption age threshold was 65 for both men and 
women.67 
So how does this fare exemption to the elderly work in practice?  For having the right to 
board without paying, eligible elders are only required to present an official document displaying 
their date of birth.  This ID can be shown either to the bus driver, ticket collector or subway 
personnel in the entrance of each station.  Additionally, eligible seniors have the option to apply 
for a special transit card, which can be used on automated ticketing equipment of buses and transit 
stations, therefore avoiding the necessity of displaying a valid ID when boarding a bus or a train. 
An important concern when estimating the fare-free policy effects on ridership is the 
possibility of frauds.  For example, people who are not eligible for the benefit could be using fake 
IDs or senior transit cards from eligible elders.  If too many individuals do not abide by the rules 
of the regulation, then any policy effects would be biased towards zero.  Unfortunately, the exact 
number of people committing fraud is not easily identifiable.  In 2015, the Transit Agency of São 
Paulo implemented a system of facial recognition in the ticketing machines of some buses, and in 
that year, 3,337 people were caught using senior transit cards from other people.  However, when 
compared to the 1.09 million senior transit cards, the number of detected frauds corresponded to a 
                                                 
65 https://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/const/con1988/CON1988_05.10.1988/art_230_.asp 
66 Municipal Law nº 11.381 of June 17, 1993 and Municipal Law nº 15.912 of December 16, 2013. 
67 In 2013, the state government also reduced the age threshold for fare exemption in those modes to 60 years old (State Law nº 15.187, of October 
29, 2013). However, the analysis carried in this paper is restricted to the years of 2007 and 2012, therefore it is not affec ted by this policy change. 
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small fraction of the total.68 Therefore, unless the total number of frauds is much higher than the 
number of individuals currently being detected committing such crimes, this specific issue is 
unlikely to severely bias my main estimates. 
Besides that, are eligible individuals aware of their benefit?  Another concern that could 
also distort the estimation of policy effects towards zero is the awareness of beneficiaries about 
the fare-free benefit.  Eligible elders who are not aware of their fare exemption would not change 
their travel behavior.  However, in a survey conducted with elders from all over the country, 94% 
of respondents reported being aware of the benefit to ride public transportation for free (Néri, 
2007).  Specific for the case of São Paulo, Martins & Massarollo (2010)also indicate that the 
eligibility for fare-free public transportation was the most well know right of the elderly among a 
sample of senior individuals. 
Still, although most people are aware of the benefit, about a quarter of eligible elderly 
report paying for their trips (METRO, 2013).  Therefore, all estimates of policy effects in this 
paper should be interpreted as intention-to-treat effects, i.e., the effects of the policy conditional 
on the willingness of individuals to exercise their benefit.  
Finally, is the number of people who ride for free relevant?  According to a report from the 
São Paulo Secretary of Transportation, in 2017, 10% of total bus ridership in the city is composed 
by trips made by fare-exempted elders.  This share corresponds to approximately 14.8 million trips 
per month.69  This same report indicates that the exemption to the elderly costs about R$ 1 billion70 
per year, or 1.85% of the overall city government budget.71 
 
 
                                                 
68 The number of repealed transit cards was based on the information provided by the São Paulo Transit Agency due to Request 12,472 to the Law 
of Access to Public Information.  The total number of activated elderly cards is based on Request 14,536. 
69 http://www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/upload/transportes/SPTrans/acesso_a_informacao/2017/detalhamento-planilha-
tarifaria-reajustejan17.xlsx. 
70 Equivaled to approximately U$320 mill ion. 
71 http://www.camara.sp.gov.br/transparencia/orcamentos-da-camara/orcamento-2017/  
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3.2    Data 
My source of information about individuals’ travel behavior are a set of household travel 
surveys from two of the largest Brazilian Metropolitan Areas, namely São Paulo and Belo 
Horizonte.72  These surveys were designed to be representative of all trips made by the population 
of each metro area in a regular working day.  For the case of São Paulo, the surveys were carried 
in 2007 and 2012.  For Belo Horizonte, the surveys are from 2002 and 2012.  In each of these 
datasets, a sample of households was randomly selected, and individuals were asked to report all 
trips taken in the day immediately before the interview.73  The information about trips include: 
motivation, transport modes, time of departure and arrival, and geocoded origins and destinations.  
Additionally, the surveys also include a rich compilation of respondent’s socioeconomic 
characteristics such as age, sex, education attainment, income, employment and vehicle ownership. 
Table 2.1 shows the basic descriptive statistics of observations from these surveys.74  They 
include 336,217 individuals, out of which 43,340 were between 55 to 69 years old.  I highlight 
older age adults because these are the relevant observations for my empirical estimation.  About a 
third of the sample had completed secondary education and about half of it owned a private vehicle.  
Both these statistics are consistent among individuals who were closer to the exemption thresholds. 
However, not surprisingly, the older were the individuals, the larger was the portion of retirees.  
Additionally, while 63% of the total sample was observed making at least one trip, this share was 
decreasing with age. 
The relationship between age and travel behavior is important because a key underlying 
assumption for the RD estimation is the continuity in the association between the running and the 
dependent variables.  In this case, the running variable is the age of individuals, and the dependent 
variables are the number of trips made by different modes.  Therefore, in order to illustrate  the 
relationship between these variables, Figure 3.1 shows the average number of trips by age in the 
sample.  From the figure, there does not seem to exist any major discontinuities between the two 
                                                 
72 São Paulo is Brazilian largest metropolitan Area, with 21 mill ion residents, and Belo Horizonte is Brazil ian 3rd largest metro area, with 5.8 mill ion 
residents (IBGE, 2016). 
73 Interviews were carried from Tuesdays to Saturdays, so all  information refers to trips made during regular weekdays.   
74 Appendix A presents additional descriptive statistics of individuals in our sample, including a comparison of surveys used in the analysis. 
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variables.  The average number of trips grows rapidly from early ages up to the end of high-school 
years.  After reaching a lifetime max at age 18, the average number of trips decreases to about 0.8 
trips per person around the age of 20, and remains mostly flat until the age of 40.  From that age 
and beyond, the average number of trips decreases almost linearly.75 
Table 3.1: Household Survey – Descriptive Characteristics of Individuals 
 
                                                 









336,217 100.0% 17,032 100.0% 14,504 100.0% 11,804 100.0%
male 159,091 47.3% 7,664 45.0% 6,386 44.0% 5,149 43.6%
female 177,126 52.7% 9,368 55.0% 8,118 56.0% 6,655 56.4%
working 141,140 42.0% 7,824 45.9% 4,583 31.6% 2,045 17.3%
retired 42,815 12.7% 4,418 25.9% 6,402 44.1% 7,653 64.8%
high-school 122,185 36.3% 6,449 37.9% 5,085 35.1% 3,589 30.4%
owns car 172,952 51.4% 10,017 58.8% 8,351 57.6% 6,376 54.0%
travels 212,967 63.3% 9,079 53.3% 6,896 47.5% 4,893 41.5%
by car 60,638 18.0% 3,662 21.5% 2,898 20.0% 1,909 16.2%
by pub. transit 64,724 19.3% 2,914 17.1% 2,192 15.1% 1,776 15.0%
by walking 78,429 23.3% 2,594 15.2% 1,925 13.3% 1,323 11.2%
by bus 54,308 16.2% 2,411 14.2% 1,870 12.9% 1,507 12.8%
by rail 10,677 3.2% 510 3.0% 332 2.3% 273 2.3%
driving 36,479 10.8% 2,746 16.1% 2,100 14.5% 1,350 11.4%
by car ride 18,371 5.5% 750 4.4% 677 4.7% 480 4.1%
to work 110,215 32.8% 5,694 33.4% 3,387 23.4% 1,681 14.2%
to other reasons 112,445 33.4% 5,090 29.9% 3,770 26.0% 2,506 21.2%
Belo Horizonte 2002 121,296 36.1% 4,810 28.2% 4,156 28.7% 3,457 29.3%
Belo Horizonte 2012 100,656 29.9% 5,840 34.3% 4,882 33.7% 3,978 33.7%
São Paulo 2007 89,970 26.8% 5,019 29.5% 4,258 29.4% 3,488 29.5%
São Paulo 2012 24,295 7.2% 1,363 8.0% 1,208 8.3% 881 7.5%
Notes:    
a














Figure 3.1: Average number of Trips by Age 
3.3    Empirical Strategy and Results 
In this session, I carry my empirical analysis used to identify the effects of the transit fare 
exemption policy on the travel behavior of its beneficiaries.  I start by investigating the adherence 
of individuals to the fare-free benefit.  Then, I describe the empirical strategy used for the 
identification of the treatment effect, detailing the main underlying assumptions for the validity of 
results.  Next, I estimate the average treatment effect using a pooled sample that includes all 
individuals in my sample.  Thereafter, I explore the different age eligibility thresholds for women 
in Belo Horizonte and São Paulo to investigate potentially confounding unobserved discontinuities 
at the policy cutoff ages.  Finally, I try to identify heterogeneities on the treatment effects by 
running separated estimations for different segments of the population. 
3.3.1    Adherence to the Benefit 
My first analysis investigates the adherence of eligible individuals to the policy benefits.  I 
explore the fact that in the household travel surveys of 2007 from São Paulo, and 2012 from Belo 
Horizonte, people who reported traveling by public transportation were also asked to indicate who 
paid for the trips.  Among the alternatives for answering this question, respondents could indicate 
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if they had traveled for free.  Therefore, on Figure 3.2, I plot the share of transit travelers who 
reported riding for free by age-distance to their corresponding exemption threshold.76 
 
Figure 3.2: Share of Transit Travelers Who Report Riding For Free By Age 
In theory, all individuals could start riding public transit for free at the same date when they 
reach the policy threshold age.  However, as it is clear on Figure 3.2, those who are exactly at the 
cutoff age are not as likely to take advantage of the benefit as those who are at least one year older.  
A few reasons could explain this fact.  First, it may take some time for individuals to become aware 
of the benefit, so those who are just at the age threshold may still not know about their right to ride 
for free.  Additionally, most of the fare exempted trips are made with the use of senior transit cards 
(Prefeitura de São Paulo, 2017).  However, for getting access to these cards, eligible elders must 
fill an application with the transit agency of their city.  This process requires the submission of 
documents attesting the fulfillment of policy eligibility requirements. 77  Although the application 
can be started as early as three months before their eligibility birthday, some elders may delay this 
process, therefore limiting their ability to fully benefit from the fare exemption policy in the first 
                                                 




few months of their eligibility period.  Hence, the treatment status of individuals who are exactly 
at the threshold age may be ambiguous.  So, to avoid any bias due to misidentification of treatment 
status, I exclude these observations from the baseline estimation of the RD model. 78 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a clear effect of eligibility for senior’s free riding on the 
share of travelers who report riding for free, which goes from less than 20% in the group of 
individuals below it, to more than 60% for those above the policy threshold age.  However, it is 
important to notice two additional aspects revealed by this figure, 1) there are individuals who ride 
for free but who are younger than the threshold age; 2) there are people above the threshold  age 
but who pay for their trips. 
The first case can be explained by the fact that other fare exemption rules exist in both São 
Paulo and Belo Horizonte.  Besides the elderly, public workers such as policemen, firefighters and 
mailmen can ride public transportation for free regardless of their age.79  Moreover, physically 
handicapped individuals can also apply for the benefit, which may explain the increasing share of 
free-riders before the senior’s exemption threshold age.  
As for the elders eligible for fare exemption who pay for the transit fare, a lack of awareness 
does not seem to explain that behavior, as 93% of elders are aware of the benefit (Néri, 2007).  An 
alternative explanation for the existence of this group could be that disadvantaged individuals 
could face some difficulty in exercising their right to ride for free, as for example, not having a 
valid ID to prove their age.  To investigate this hypothesis, I run a balance test of observed 
characteristics comparing eligible individuals (older than 65) who pay for the fare with those in 
the same age group but who report riding for free.  The results of this comparison are shown in 
Table 3.2.  On average, the individuals who pay for the transit fare are wealthier, more educated, 
                                                 
78 The exclusion of observations close to the running variable threshold is referred in the literature as a “Donut -RD”.  This procedure is most 
common in cases of heaping data at the running variable threshold (Almond & Jr, 2011), (Eggers, Fowler, Hainmueller, Hall, & Jr., 2015). Although 
it is undesirable to exclude this data points, the first alternative would be to consider them as treated, which would likely  misidentify several 
individuals who may not be able to ride for free, thus biasing any discontinuity estimate towards zero.  Alternatively, I could try to identify i n the 
data those individuals who reported traveling for free and those who did not, and then use this information to assign treatment status.  The main 
issues associated with this procedure are twofold; first it is unclear how to assign treatment status for individuals who do not travel by public 
transportation at all, in which case we cannot be sure if they would or would not pay for  the fare.  Secondly, even if identification of treatment 
status was perfect, that would lead to the issue of selection into treatment, as those exactly at the threshold who were more likely to desire free 
trips would also be more likely to register earlier for senior transit cards. 




more likely to own a vehicle and more likely to be employed80 than the group of individuals who 
report traveling for free.  Therefore, lower access to the policy by disadvantaged individuals may 
not be the main factor explaining why some people pay for the transit fare even when they are 
eligible to ride for free.  Instead possible explanations include personal pride or irrelevance of the 
cost for wealthier individuals. 
Given these results it is important to highlight that further RD results can be interpreted as 
intention to treat effects since the treatment variable that is being analyzed is the eligibility for 
free-riding, and not the act of traveling by public transportation for free. 
Table 3.2: Balance Test Between Payers and Free-Riders  
Transit Riders Eligible for Fare Exemption (Age > 65) 
 
3.3.2    Pooled RD Estimation 
To identify how the policy of fare-free public transportation affects the travel behavior of 
individuals, I employ a regression discontinuity design (RDD).  In synthesis, this method compares 
the average number of trips made by individuals who are just younger and just older than the policy 
eligibility threshold.  The main advantage of this empirical approach is that the underlying 
assumptions needed for the internal validity of results are relatively weak.  Basically, it is assumed 
that the unobserved characteristics that affect travel behavior are similar for individuals on both 
sides of the policy threshold, and that the relationship between the running variable (age), and 
                                                 







female 0.562 0.583 -0.871 0.384
age 73.2 72.7 1.880 0.060
works 0.114 0.168 -3.042 0.002 **
retired 0.807 0.763 2.176 0.030 *
high school 0.294 0.344 -2.193 0.029 *
owns car 0.386 0.412 -1.066 0.287










dependent variable (number of trips) should be described by a continuous function.  If these 
assumptions hold, then any discontinuities in the dependent variable at the threshold age could 
only be attributed to the policy effect. 
Because different groups of people become eligible for fare exemption at different ages, I 
normalize the running variable 𝑑𝑖 as the difference of individuals’ age to their eligibility threshold: 
𝑑𝑖 =  𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
𝑜 (1) 
Where 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 is the age of individual 𝑖, 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
𝑜 is the age threshold for fare exemption 
eligibility for that particular individual, and 𝑑𝑖 is the difference between those values.  From the 
normalized running variable, the treatment status 𝑇𝑖 of individuals in my sample is defined as: 
𝑇𝑖 = 0        𝑖𝑓        𝑑𝑖 < 0 
𝑇𝑖 = 1        𝑖𝑓        𝑑𝑖 ≥ 0 
(2) 
Moreover, using this normalized running variable, I show on Figure 3.3 the graphical 
evidence about the relationship between the running and dependent variables of my study.  Each 
panel of the figure show the average number of trips by age-distance to the policy threshold for 
different modes.  In all four panels, we can verify a decreasing number of trips with age.  As for 
discontinuities at the cutoff, Panel B seems to indicate that number of trips by public transportation 
goes up, and Panel D indicates a smaller discontinuity in the opposite direction for walking trips.  
As for the other modes, the graphical evidence is not clear, and no apparent trend discontinuity 
can be observed.  To formally estimate the size and significance of these effects, I estimate a 
standard RD model, which can be described by the following equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑚   =   𝛽0𝑚   +   𝛽1𝑚 𝑓𝑚 (𝑑𝑖 ) 𝑇𝑖   +   𝛽2𝑚 𝑓𝑚 (𝑑𝑖) (1 − 𝑇𝑖)  +   𝛽3𝑚 𝑇𝑖   +   𝛾𝑚  𝑋  +   𝑖𝑚 (3) 
Where the outcome variable 𝑦𝑖𝑚  is the number of trips made by individual 𝑖 using mode 
𝑚.  Moreover, 𝑓𝑚(𝑑𝑖 ) is a continuous function that describes the relationship between the running 
variable 𝑑𝑖 and the dependent variable.  Furthermore, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of controls that include gender, 
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city of residence, income, vehicle ownership and employment status.  Finally,  𝑖𝑚 is a noise term 
that captures all other unobservables. 
 





The main coefficient of interest is 𝛽3𝑚, which describes, for each mode, any discontinuity 
in the outcome variable at the policy age cutoff.  Under the assumption of continuity of 𝑦𝑖𝑚  on 𝑑𝑖 
at 𝑑𝑖 = 0, 𝛽3 is equivalent to the policy average treatment effect at the threshold (Imbens & 
Lemieux, 2007).  In my baseline RD estimation, I use a linear approximation of 𝑓𝑚(𝑑𝑖 ) and I subset 
the estimation to a neighborhood of observations around the threshold using the non-parametrical 
minimum square error optimization procedure suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik 
(2014).  Observations within the selected bandwidth are weighted using a triangular kernel.  
Finally, standard errors are clustered by age, gender and metro area.   
Using these baseline specifications,81 Table 3.3 shows the results for the estimation of 𝛽3 
for different travel modes.  The table presents first the absolute discontinuity in the average number 
of trips, and then the relative corresponding value given the counterfactual number of trips in the 
absence of the policy.82 
  In line with the graphical evidence presented in Figure 3.3, the main impact of the policy 
is an increase in the demand for public modes.  The point estimate for public transit indicates that 
the fare-free policy increases the average number of trips of beneficiaries in 0.051 trips per capita, 
which corresponds to an increase of 22.8% in ridership among beneficiaries.  As for the other 
modes, results are not statistically significant, and the largest coefficient in terms of magnitude is 
a decrease in approximately 9.6% in trips made by walking, although that results is not sufficiently 
precise for a final inference.  The point estimate for private vehicle is particularly small, and if 
anything, positive, which indicates a relatively precise null effect of the policy on the demand for 
private modes. 
Summing up, while there seems to be a positive effect of the policy on the demand for 




                                                 
81 Appendix C Shows the consistent of these estimates to alternative RDD specifications 
82 Appendix D il lustrates the interpretation of each of these coefficients . 
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Table 3.3: Fare Exemption Effect on the Average Number of Trips by Mode 
 
3.4    Testing for Unobserved Disruptions at the Policy Threshold 
The main threat to the validity of previous estimates is the existence of unobserved chocks 
that could affect travel behavior and be correlated with the age threshold used for  defining the 
eligibility to the policy.  This is particularly concerning in my empirical setup because the age 
cutoffs used for fare exemption eligibility are equivalent to the cutoffs used for other policies and 
befits for the elderly.  Some examples include the minimum age for start collecting social security 
benefits in Brazil (60 years for women, 65 for men),  83 preferential lines on public offices, banks 
and other services (60 years),84 preferred parking slots (60 years),85 and reserved seats on public 
                                                 
83 http://www.previdencia.gov.br/servicos-ao-cidadao/todos-os-servicos/aposentadoria-por-idade/ 
84 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/L10.741.htm  








Absolute 0.051 0.068 ** 0.008 -0.031
(0.036) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022)
Relative 0.044 0.228 ** 0.015 -0.096
(0.032) (0.071) (0.053) (0.068)
Covariates2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth (yrs.) 8 8 8 8
Polin. Fit Degree 1 1 1 1
Kernel Triang. Triang. Triang. Triang.




Trips by Travel Mode
º p<0.1;    * p < 0.05;     ** p < 0.01;    *** p < 0.001
Absolute effect refers to the chages in the average number of trips. Relative effects is the
coefficient between the absolute effect and the counterfactual number of trips in the absence of
the policy at the cutoff value, for example, a coefficient of 0.5 indicates an increase of 50% on
average.Covariates include working status, car ownership, metropolitan area, income and gender.
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transportation (60 years).86  If the eligibility for these other benefits were to affect the demand for 
public transportation and other modes, then the RD estimates would not be capturing the causal 
effect of the fare exemption policy, but instead, the combined effect of all these policies. 
To start investigating this question, I verify the existence of age trend discontinuities on 
observed variables that are unlikely to be caused by the fare exemption policy.  To test the 
existence of these discontinuities, I estimate a similar model as the one employed in the previous 
session, however, instead of using the number of trips as the dependent variable, I use observed 
characteristics of individuals such as working status, vehicle ownership, education, place of 
residence and household income.  Table 3.4 shows the resulting estimates of these regressions.87 
Table 3.4: Discontinuities of Observed Individual Characteristics  
 
                                                 
86 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L10048.htm  
87 Appendix E includes a series of plots showing the association between each of these variables and the running variable of the  
RD model. 
Dependent Variables: Changes in Individual Characteristics
1












    Absolute Effect 0.065 *** -0.035 ** -0.007 -0.011 -40.071 -0.017
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (166.334) (0.012)
    Relative Effect 0.133 *** -0.126 ** -0.012 -0.033 -0.010 -0.027
(0.025) (0.040) (0.022) (0.035) (0.040) (0.019)
Covariates No No No No No No
Bandwidth (yrs.) 8 8 8 8 8 8
Polin. Fit Degree 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kernel Triang. Triang. Triang. Triang. Triang. Triang.
Observations 37,156 37,156 36,906 37,156 15,138 37,156
Notes: º p<0.1;    * p < 0.05;     ** p < 0.01;    *** p < 0.001
1 Absolute effect refers to the chages in the average number of trips. Relative effects is the coefficient between the absolute effect and the




From this exercise, we can identify significant discontinuities associated with employment 
and retirement status of individuals.  This result is not surprising because the Brazilian minimum 
age for workers to start collecting social security benefits coincides with the fare exemption 
threshold for a large portion of my sample.88  For all other variables included in the analysis, the 
discontinuities are negligible.  Anyway, the existence of a discontinuity in the likelihood of 
retirement, that coincides with the fare exemption age threshold triggers a warning for the internal 
validity of my main RD estimates.  Although I include retirement and employment status as 
controls in the baseline regressions, if the effects of these concomitant chocks are not correctly 
captured by my covariates specification, that could lead to bias on my results. 
To overcome this threat, I explore the earlier fare exemption eligibility that existed for 
women in São Paulo.  For this analysis, I run two distinct sets of RD regressions, first using the 
subset of observations of women from São Paulo, and second, I restrict the sample to women from 
Belo Horizonte.  In both cases, I use the age of 60 as the threshold for the RD estimation.  
Therefore, in the first set of regressions which use data of women from São Paulo, the model 
estimates the true fare exemption effect for that subgroup.  However, in the case of the second set 
of regressions, which use data of women from Belo Horizonte, the estimations are placebo effects 
since the fare exemption did not start at age 60 in that city.    However, if significant travel behavior 
changes were to occur at that age, and those were confounding my main results, then these effects 
should be observed in the placebo group. 
Moreover, I also explore an additional aspect of the fare exemption threshold for women 
in São Paulo to test potentially confounding discontinuities.  The eligibility for free public 
transportation at age 60 for women in São Paulo was limited to municipal buses.  Therefore, for 
that group, I can also estimate a placebo model investigating confounding factors affecting the 
demand of women for public modes other than bus89 at the threshold age of 60.  Because women 
had no right for riding for free on trains at age 60, any discontinuity in ridership at that age could 
only be attributed to other unobserved chocks at the threshold. 
                                                 
88 The threshold is the same for women from São Paulo (60 years), and men from São Paulo and Belo Horizonte (65 years).  
89 That basically corresponds to rail. 
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Table 3.5: Travel Behavior Discontinuities at the Age of 60 – Subsample of Female 
 
The results from these two regressions are presented on Table 3.5.90  In the case of women 
from São Paulo, results mostly mirror what was observed in the pooled estimations.  I find a 
significant increase in the share of trips by public transportation, a large, but non-significant 
reduction of walking trips and no significant effects in the case of trips by private vehicle or in the 
total number of trips.  Supporting the internal validity of main results, the results associated with 
transit sub-modes in São Paulo show that all the ridership effect on public transit ridership for 
women was concentrated on buses, where they actually had the free-ride right.  Meanwhile, on 
rail, where women still had to pay, the changes in ridership were found to be exactly zero. 
                                                 













    Absolute Effect 0.132 0.118 * 0.096 -0.081 0.118 * 0.000
(0.091) (0.056) (0.071) (0.056) (0.050) (0.028)
    Relative Effect 0.095 0.302 * 0.163 -0.207 0.388 * 0.002
(0.066) (0.142) (0.120) (0.144) (0.164) (0.324)
Belo Horizonte Women
    Absolute Placebo Effect -0.063 -0.039 0.011 -0.025
(0.048) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033)
    Relative Placebo Effect -0.069 -0.126 0.045 -0.072
(0.052) (0.094) (0.123) (0.098)
Covariates
2
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth (yrs.) 8 8 8 8 8 8
Polin. Fit Degree 1 1 1 1 1 1




º p<0.1;    * p < 0.05;     ** p < 0.01;    *** p < 0.001
Absolute effect refers to the chages in the average number of trips. Relative effects is the coefficient between the absolute effect
and the counterfactual number of trips in the absence of the policy at the cutoff value, for example, a coefficient of 0.5 indicates
an increase of 50% on average.
Covariates include working status, car ownership, metropolitan area, income and gender.
Dependent Variable: Changes in Trips by Travel Mode
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In the case of the placebo tests for women from Belo Horizonte, there is also no evidence 
of significant confounding effects at age.  If anything, the results indicate a reduction in the use of 
public transportation at that age threshold, although the point estimate is not sufficiently precise.   
All these results indicate that we cannot reject the assumption that are no unobserved 
chocks on travel demand associated with the fare eligibility threshold age, at least in the case of 
women from São Paulo.  Therefore, we cannot reject the interpretation of our main results as  the 
causal effect of the fare exemption policy. 
3.5    Treatment Effect Heterogeneity 
Finally, I investigate the heterogeneity of treatment effects on different groups of 
individuals.  I run a series of RD estimations using different subsets of the population.  Ideally, I 
would like to estimate the average treatment effect for all relevant combinations of individual 
characteristics.  However, one of the main limitations of the RDD is that estimations are restricted 
to the neighborhood of the running variable threshold, limiting the statistical power of estimations 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2008), therefore meaningful inference for small subsets of the population is 
not feasible with my sample. 
Given this limitation, I estimate a series of models using different partitions of my total 
sample.  First, I compare the results for subsets defined in terms of gender and metro area.  I then 
investigate how individuals of different socioeconomic backgrounds are differently affected by the 
fare exemption, splitting the sample in terms of income, education, vehicle ownership and place 
of residence.  Results from all these estimations are presented on Table 3.6.  For concision, the 
table only includes the relative effects of the policy.  In general, results do not differ from the main 
estimates of the pooled model.  The larger and most significant effects are positive chocks on the 













    Male 0.058 0.237 * 0.038 -0.096
(0.046) (0.110) (0.071) (0.111)
    Female 0.036 0.223 * -0.004 -0.095
(0.044) (0.092) (0.079) (0.087)
Metro Area
    São Paulo 0.092 º 0.313 ** 0.067 -0.087
(0.051) (0.115) (0.082) (0.124)
    Belo Horizonte 0.012 0.178 º -0.026 -0.108
(0.044) (0.095) (0.078) (0.083)
Car Ownership
    Owns Car 0.011 0.165 0.027 -0.159
(0.040) (0.108) (0.058) (0.099)
    Doesn't Own Car 0.119 * 0.261 ** 0.007 -0.039
(0.055) (0.090) (0.207) (0.092)
Education
    High School -0.006 0.149 0.024 -0.216 *
(0.042) (0.111) (0.064) (0.097)
    No High School 0.066 0.235 ** -0.019 -0.010
(0.042) (0.078) (0.022) (0.082)
Covariates2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth (yrs.) 8 8 8 8
Polin. Fit Degree 1 1 1 1
Kernel Triang. Triang. Triang. Triang.
Notes: º p<0.1;    * p < 0.05;     ** p 
1
2
All coefficients are presented as relative effects. That is, a coefficient of 0.5 indicates an increase of 50%.
Covariates include working status, car ownership, metropolitan area, income and gender.




As for the heterogeneities of estimates, effects do not present any significant differences 
by gender, with roughly the same point estimates men and women.  In the case of Metro Areas, 
the effect on ridership was found to be larger in São Paulo (31.3%) if compared to Belo Horizonte 
(17.8%).  Moreover, in the case of São Paulo the coefficient associated with the total number of 
trips was slightly significant, indicating that the policy effect on transit demand was sufficiently 
large to become visible in the overall number of trips in the city. 
The remaining comparisons are related to variables that are associated with socioeconomic 
status, and their results are well aligned.  For both the individuals who do not own a car and have 
not completed secondary education, the effects of free-fare on transit ridership were larger, which 
is not surprising since the use of public transportation is concentrated among less wealthy 
individuals.  In the case of people who owned a car or have completed high-school, point estimates 
were still positive, but no longer significant.  This result is particularly relevant for starting to 
understand the mechanisms behind the null results of the policy on mode substitution.  The 
response of wealthier individuals who own private vehicles do not seem to be a substitution 
between private to public modes.  Instead, for this group what we observe is a reduction in walking 
trips associated with the policy.  This result could be associated with the better transit infrastructure 
and the higher number of urban opportunities in wealthier parts of the city.  Within these regions, 
it seems likely that one could substitute a walking trip with a short transit ride.  However, in the 
case of suburb residents, not many opportunities are available at walking distance, so the additional 
transit ridership caused by the fare exemption is more likely to be associated with longer routes 
that otherwise would not be made.  
Summing up, while the policy seems to have a larger direct impact on the demand for 
public transportation for the more disadvantaged, the only effect for wealthier individuals seems 
to be a substitution from walking, a result that is the opposite of the expected if the policy had the 





3.6    Conclusion 
This paper has investigated how a policy of free-fare public transportation affects the travel 
behavior of beneficiaries.  I have first shown that, in general individuals who have the right to 
travel for free do take advantage of this benefit when riding public transportation.    Next, I have 
shown that the policy is associated with a significant and consistent increase in average transit 
ridership.  I ruled out the hypothesis that this effect could be associated with unobserved chocks 
concomitant with the policy threshold.  Finally, I’ve found that the ridership effect was mostly 
concentrated on individuals with lower socioeconomic characteristics and who do not own a car.  
With respect to mode substitution, I have not found any evidence of a reduction in the use 
of private vehicles associated with the eligibility for free public transportation.  If anything, we 
found preliminary evidence that wealthier individuals may actually be substituting walking trips 
for public transportation due to the fare exemption policy. 
Contrary to the policy recommendations from (Basso & Silva, 2014) and (Parry & Small, 
2009), our results suggest that subsidizing the public transit fare may be of limited effectiveness 
for reducing the social costs associated with the externalities of private vehicles use.  Instead our 
results favor the analysis of (Storchmann, 2003), who argued that automobile externalities should 
not be answered by transit fare subsidies and that externalities would be better addressed by 
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INTERCONTINENTAL, AV JAGUARE, AV ESCOLA POLITECNICA, 
AV ESCOLA POLITECNICA, AV DR ANTONIO MARIA LAET, AV 
DR ANTONIO MARIA LAET, RUA PARANABI, RUA 




11/19/2015 11/25/2015 AV S GABRIEL, AV SANTO AMARO, AV JOAO DIAS, AV ADOLFO 




11/23/2015 11/27/2015 AV MIGUEL IGNACIO CURI, RUA CASTELO DO PIAUI, AV 




11/27/2015 12/2/2015 AV PAES DE BARROS, RUA TAQUARI, RUA BRESSER, VD 
BRESSER, AV BERNARDINO BRITO FONSECA DE CA, AV 
BERNARDINO BRITO FONSECA DE CA, AV PROF EDGAR SANTOS, 




12/2/2015 12/4/2015 AV PIRES DO RIO, AV DEP JOSE ARISTODEMO PINOTTI, AV DEP 
JOSE ARISTODEMO PINOTTI, ES DO IMPERADOR, ES DE MOGI 




12/4/2015 12/9/2015 RUA DR ASSIS RIBEIRO, AV VER ABEL FERREIRA, RUA BRIG 
GAVIAO PEIXOTO, RUA MONTE PASCAL, VD DOMINGOS DE 




12/9/2015 12/11/2015 AV INAJAR DE SOUZA, AV INAJAR DE SOUZA, AV COMEN 
MARTINELLI, AV ERMANO MARCHETTI, AV MARQ DE SAO 
VICENTE, RUA SERGIO TOMAS, RUA NORMA PIERUCCINI 
GIANNOTTI, AV RUDGE, VD ENG ORLANDO MURGEL, AV RIO 
BRANCO, AV ORDEM E PROGRESSO, PTE JULIO DE MESQUITA 
NETO, AV NICOLAS BOER, VD POMPEIA, AV ALEXANDRE 
COLARES, AV MANOEL MONTEIRO DE ARAUJO, AV DOMINGOS 
DE SOUZA MARQUES, AV ALM DELAMARE, RUA ANCHIETA, 




12/14/2015 12/16/2015 AV SARG MIGUEL DE SOUSA FILHO, AV TTE AMARO 
FELICISSIMO DA SILVEIRA, AV TTE AMARO FELICISSIMO DA 




12/16/2015 12/18/2015 RUA MANOEL BARBOSA, AV RAIMUNDO PEREIRA DE MAGAL., 
RUA PRINCIPAL(PERUS), RUA GUIDO CALOI, AV GIOVANNI 
GRONCHI, ES DO ALVARENGA, RUA DR JOSE MARIA 
WHITAKER, RUA ALVINOPOLIS, AV ANTONIO BATUIRA, AV 
QUEIROZ FILHO, RUA CERRO CORA, RUA CERRO CORA, RUA 




12/16/2015 12/18/2015 AV DUQ DE CAXIAS http://capital.sp.gov.br/noticia/cet-implanta-reducao-
de-velocidade-maxima-em-mais-14-vias





































Auto 7,159 12,127 19,324
Motorcycle 2,473 2,741 4,270
Bike 0 169 124
Utility Veh. 10,570 20,240 35,091
Truck 22,314 65,656 47,825
Bus 16,069 10,537 20,686
Other 10,307 80,109 81,209
Victims Cost
Unharmed 1,086 4,111 1,840
Injured 14,439 66,802 74,896
Fatality - - 3,862,030
Accident Severity
Notes: All values are presented BRL of 2015. All parameters were
extracted from Carvalho et al. (2015), except Fatal Victims Costs,









Figure A.3: Road Segments with Speed Limit Reductions in 2015 
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UFABC quotas 50% phs
blacks on phs
indigenous on phs
2007 Starting in 2007 (when the university was created), UFABC
reserved 50% of its positions to students who graduated from
public secondary schools. Out of this total, 27.2% (13.6% of
total) was reserved for black students and 0.4% (0.2% of total) to
indigenous.
UFAC none 2013 Until 2012 UFAC did not have any type of AAP in their selection
process.
UFAL quotas 20% blacks
black women
2005 UFAL reserved 20% of its positions to students who self-declare
as black. Starting in 2006, 60% of this quota was restricted to
black women.
UFAM none 2013 Until 2012 UFAM did not have any type of AAP in their
selection process.
UFBA quotas 45% phs
blacks on phs
indigenous on phs
2005 Starting in 2005, UFBA started a program of quotas where
36.55% of its positions were reserved to black students from
public high schools, 6.45% were reserved to all public high school
students and 2 % were reserved to indigenous.
UFC none 2013 Until 2012 UFC did not have any type of AA police in their
selection process
UFCG none Until 2012 UFCG did not have any type of AA police in their
selection process
UFES quotas 40 - 45% phs 2008 Starting in 2008, UFES reserved 40% of its positions to students
who did 4 years of primary education and all secondary education 
on public high schools. This share was increased to 45% in 2009
and was kept at that level until 2012.
UFF bonus 10-20% phs 2008 UFF granted a 10% bonus on the exam score of students who
graduated from public secondary education. The bonus was
increased to 20% in 2012.
UFG quotas 20% phs
blacks on phs
2005 UFG reserved 10% of its positions to public high school students
and additional 10% to black students from public high schools.
UFJF quotas 30  - 50% phs
blacks on phs
2006 Starting in 2006, UFJF reserved 30% of its positions to students
from public high school. Out of this share, 50% (25% of total)
was reserved for black students. The total share was increase to
40% in 2007 and 50% in 2008, and remained at that level until
2012.
UFLA none 2013 Until 2012 UFLA did not have any type of AA police in their
selection process.
UFMA quotas 50% phs
blacks
blacks on phs
2007 Starting in 2007, UFMA reserves 25% of its positions to students
from public high school and 25% to black students regardless of
their type of high school. In 2009 the share reserved for black
students was restricted to students who completed secondary
education on public high schools. The policy remained the same
until 2012.
UFMG bonus 10 - 15% phs
blacks on phs
2009 UFMG granted a bonus of 10% to the score of students who
completed all secondary education and the last 4 years of primary
education on public high schools. Additionally, the students who
satisfied the above criteria and were self-declared as black, would

















UFMS none 2013 Until 2012 UFMS did not have any type of AAP in their selection
process.




2008 Starting in 2008, UFSM reserved its positions according to the
following system: 11% for black students, 5% for handicapped,
20% for public schools and up to 8 new positions for indigenous.
The system remained roughly the same until 2012 with a yearly
increment of 1% in the share reserved for black students.
UFMT quotas 50% phs
blacks on phs
2012 Starting in 2012, UFMT created a system of quotas where 50%
of its positions were reserved for public high school students.
Out of this total, 40% (20% of total) will be reserved to black
candidates.
UFOP quotas 30% phs 2009 Starting in the second semester of 2008, UFOP started reserving
30% of its positions to students who completed all secondary
education on public schools.
UFPA quotas 50% phs
blacks on phs
2006 The policy at UFPA reserved 50% of its positions to students
who completed all secondary education on public high schools.
40% of this share (20% of total) was reserved for students who
declared themselves as black (negro ). In both cases, students
had to opt in.
UFPB quotas 25 - 30% phs 2006 Starting in 2006, UFPB reserved 25% of its positions to students
from public secondary schools. In 2012 this share was increased
to 30%.  Official notices for those exams could not be found.
UFPE bonus 10% phs 2005 Starting in 2005, UFPE granted a bonus of 10% on the score of
students who completed the whole secondary education on public
high schools on the surrounding areas of each of its campi. The
policy remained mostly the same until 2012 with some changes
about the geographical areas in each vestibular. Formal
information such as notices and exam calls is really hard to find
for UFPE.
UFPEL none 2013 Until 2012, UFPEL did not have any type of AAP in their
selection process.
UFPI quotas 5 - 20% phs
blacks on phs
2007 In 2007, UFPI reserved 5% of its positions to students who
completed all primary and secondary education on public schools.
In 2008 this share was increased to 20% and remained like that
until 2012.
UFPR quotas 40% phs
blacks
2005 Starting in 2005, UFPR started a program of quotas where 20%
of its positions were reserved to students from public high schools 
(with up to one year studied on private schools) and 20% were
reserved to black students. The policy remained mostly the same
until 2012, except for some changes in the required number of
years studied in public schools. For the process of 2012 students
were required to have studied all secondary and primary
education to be eligible to the 20% of positions reserved for
public schools.
UFRB quotas 45% phs
blacks on phs
indigenous on phs
2006 Founded in 2006, UFRB had its entrance exams carried by
UFBA until 2010, hence it followed the same system of quotas of
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UFRGS quotas 30% phs
blacks on phs
2008 UFRGS reserved 30% of its positions to students who completed
the whole secondary and primary education on public high
schools. Addionally, 50% of this positions (15% of total), were
reserved to students who self-declared as black.
UFRN bonus by 
program
phs 2006 Since 2006 grants a score bonus on the admission exam for
students from public high schools from that state. The bonus is
individually defined for each academic program.
UFRPE bonus 10% phs 2005 Starting in 2005, UFRPE granted a bonus of 10% on the score of
students who completed the whole secondary education on public
high schools of the countryside of the state. The policy remained
mostly the same until 2012 with some changes about the
geographical areas in each vestibular. Formal information from
official notices were not found.
UFRR none 2013 Until 2012 UFRR did not have any type of AA police in their
selection process.
UFRRJ bonus 10% phs 2010 Starting in 2010, UFRRJ started giving a bonus of 10% to
students who completed the whole secondary education on public
schools.
UFS quotas 50% phs
blacks on phs
2010 Starting in 2010, UFS started selecting 50% of its student from
individuals who completed the whole secondary education and at
least 4 years of primary education on public schools. Out of this
share, 70% (35% of total) is reserved to students who self declare 
as black.
UFSC quotas 30% phs
blacks on phs
2008 UFSC program of quotas had 20% of its positions were reserved
to public high school students and 10% additional positions were
reserved to black students from public high schools
UFSCAR quotas 20 - 40% phs
blacks on phs
2008 Starting in 2008, UFSCAR started a program of quotas where
20% of its positions were reserved for students who studied the
whole secondary education on public schools. Out of this share,
35% (7% of total) was reserved to black students from public
high schools. In 2011 the total share was increased from 20% to
40%. The policy remained the same until 2012. Official exam
calls for the period were not found.
UFSJ quotas 50% phs
blacks on phs
indigenous on phs
2010 Starting in 2010, UFSJ started reserving 50% of its positions to
tstudents who completed primary and secondary education on
public schools. Within this quota, a share corresponding to the
proportion of each race in the state of Minas Gerais was reserved
for each race. Therefore, an additional quota of 46% (23% of
total) was reserved for black, brown and indigenous students
from public schools.
UFT quotas 5% indigenous 2005 UFT reserved 5% of its positions to indigenous individuals. Until
2013, no other AA policy was introduced
UFTM bonus 10% phs 2009 Starting in the second half of 2009, UFTM started granting a
bonus of 10% to students who completed 4 years of primary
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UFU quotas 25 - 50% phs 2011 Starting in 2008, UFU created a specific vestibular for students
from public high schools who studied at least 4 years of primary
education on public schools. This vestibular would consist of 3
exams taken once a year during secondary education. Therefore,
the first students selected through this process would enter
university in 2011. The share of positions selected through this
process ranged from 25%-50%. The system faced a series of
judicial disputes and different court orders had varying verdicts
about the validity of reservations.
UFV none 2013 Until 2012 UFV did not have any type of AAP in their selection
process.
UnB quotas 20% blacks 2004 UnB was the first federal university to start a program of quotas
in Brazil. Starting in the second semester of 2004, UnB reserved
20% of regular vestibular positions to black students.
Unifal none 2013 Until 2012 Unifal did not have any type of AA police in their
selection process.
UNIFAP none 2013 Until 2012 UNIFAP did not have any type of AAP in their
selection process.
Unifei none 2013 Until 2012 Unifei did not have any type of AAP in their selection
process.
Unifesp quotas 10% blacks on phs
indigenous on phs
2005 Unifesp system of quotas reserved 10% to black or indigenous
students who completed all secondary education on public
schools
Unirio none 2013 Until 2012 Unirio did not have any type of AAP in their selection
process.
Univasf quotas 50% phs 2010 In 2010, Univasf started reserving 50% of its positions to
students from public high schools.  
URG (FURG) bonus 6 - 10% phs
blacks on phs
2010 Starting with the exam of 2010, FURG granted a bonus of 6% to
the score of students who completed at least 2 years of their
secondary education on public high schools. Additionally, the
students who satisfied the above criteria and were self-declared as 
black, would gain an additional of 3%. The system was slightly
changed in 2011 with the following system of bonus: 4% for
students from public school and additional 6% for black students
from public high schools.  The system was the same in 2012.
UTFPR quotas 50% phs 2008 UFTPR reserved 50% of its positions to students who completed




Table B.2: Sample of Freshmen by University and ENADE Academic Group (2004-2010) 
 
  
University 2004 2007 2010 2005 2008 2006 2009 Total
UFRJ 387 467 1,115 1,214 2,205 674 1,468 7,530
UFPE 379 508 854 1,069 1,453 860 2,090 7,213
UFF 347 478 1,327 1,197 1,792 770 1,213 7,124
UFPA 254 435 852 1,557 1,904 742 1,116 6,860
UFRGS 466 388 946 862 1,471 594 1,581 6,308
UFBA 265 520 1,181 1,183 1,390 677 990 6,206
UFSC 325 323 769 1,124 1,371 600 1,628 6,140
UFMG 464 436 1,284 903 1,301 510 1,240 6,138
UFMT 532 534 1,001 1,237 1,337 398 980 6,019
UFPI 277 388 1,189 443 1,746 310 1,654 6,007
UFG 443 555 1,077 882 1,477 522 893 5,849
UFRN 343 338 906 975 1,354 562 1,152 5,630
UFAM 268 468 974 693 1,485 383 1,220 5,491
UFPB 427 413 952 664 1,177 615 1,216 5,464
UnB 325 354 694 969 1,017 602 1,302 5,263
UFPR 377 484 1,080 649 997 491 1,035 5,113
UFAL 397 606 939 500 1,337 252 886 4,917
UFS 360 305 732 691 1,385 351 740 4,564
UFES 268 340 674 460 982 465 1,308 4,497
UFSM 378 610 864 651 875 336 748 4,462
UFMS 285 251 435 788 934 536 1,019 4,248
UFC 258 282 615 824 1,081 311 810 4,181
UFU 246 236 575 462 1,346 259 770 3,894
UFPEL 267 400 928 445 979 168 349 3,536
UFMA 115 276 437 521 895 433 634 3,311
UFCG 73 107 529 734 1,159 191 482 3,275
UFV 300 281 496 640 796 210 423 3,146
UFJF 264 202 497 472 764 277 521 2,997
UFRPE 182 469 826 375 794 98 131 2,875
UFT 145 146 299 557 944 239 420 2,750
UFRRJ 217 215 305 268 413 225 967 2,610
Unirio 136 168 436 208 286 465 641 2,340
UFSCar 149 152 211 507 1,022 94 139 2,274
URG 62 69 95 558 593 179 498 2,054
UFAC 178 153 304 361 785 97 138 2,016
Ufop 97 66 140 536 804 149 218 2,010
Unir 31 70 115 320 571 294 341 1,742
UTFPR 31 113 164 159 652 71 88 1,278
UFRR 60 62 117 198 312 208 313 1,270
UFSJ 31 25 0 307 497 143 252 1,255
Unifesp 117 328 690 0 0 31 49 1,215
Ufla 140 128 408 197 245 28 48 1,194
Univasf 0 228 273 88 235 79 178 1,081
UNIFAP 31 34 53 228 411 90 87 934
Unifal 113 129 236 38 119 0 0 635
UFTM 51 144 349 0 0 10 0 554
Unifei 0 0 0 159 301 30 40 530








  LT × t2 × Clow   
e,f,g 0.018 0.018 0.088 -0.040 0.002
(0.081) (0.095) (0.123) (0.049) (0.081)
  LT × t2 × Cmed 0.100 0.038 0.008 0.054 0.030
(0.062) (0.071) (0.096) (0.038) (0.063)










(0.058) (0.068) (0.094) (0.036) (0.060)
  ET × t2 × Clow 0.050 0.143 0.106 -0.011 0.126
(0.071) (0.083) (0.109) (0.044) (0.074)




(0.068) (0.079) (0.105) (0.042) (0.070)







(0.065) (0.076) (0.104) (0.040) (0.067)






(0.038) (0.043) (0.057) (0.023) (0.038)






(0.043) (0.050) (0.067) (0.026) (0.044)







(0.045) (0.053) (0.074) (0.028) (0.047)
Program FE yes yes yes yes yes
Obs 1,300 1,326 1,230 1,372 1,380
Adj R2 0.873 0.758 0.774 0.904 0.463
notes:
  Coefficients can be interpreted as relative changes.  E.g., a coefficient of 0.5 indicates an increase of 50%
f Post: dummy indicating the second cycle of ENADE exams (2008, 2009 and 2010)
g Program Competitivenss was defined based on the minimum SISU score of 2016.  For details, see Figure 1.
e LT AAP:  Programs which had no AAP in 2005-2007, but adopted it in 2008-2010
Dependent variable:
*p<0.05,  **p<0.01,  ***p<0.001.
a Black: refers to the combined group of Pretos and Pardos
b PHSS: Public High School Student (all years)
c Low-educ parents: none of the student's parents have studied beyond primary education






































female 49,116 10,286,385 52.7% 12,898 10,443,713 52.2% 52,743 2,557,215 52.7%
male 42,289 9,248,235 47.3% 11,636 9,567,990 47.8% 47,913 2,290,945 47.3%
0 - 19 22,062 5,429,047 27.8% 6,381 5,507,141 27.5% 26,423 1,258,815 26.0%
20 - 39 29,249 6,413,396 32.8% 7,890 6,415,779 32.1% 31,699 1,535,324 31.7%
40 - 59 24,331 5,099,146 26.1% 6,366 5,152,632 25.7% 26,078 1,254,179 25.9%
60 - 79 13,048 2,259,223 11.6% 3,249 2,497,271 12.5% 13,877 674,915 13.9%
80 - + 2,715 333,809 1.7% 648 438,880 2.2% 2,579 124,928 2.6%
working 44,412 8,888,409 45.5% 12,199 9,711,942 48.5% 41,963 2,032,936 41.9%
retired 13,125 2,412,667 12.4% 3,167 2,449,236 12.2% 14,975 725,842 15.0%
unemployed 6,500 1,661,602 8.5% 1,612 1,391,430 7.0% 8,136 387,030 8.0%
never worked 6,717 1,707,149 8.7% 1,659 1,440,879 7.2% 1,034 49,910 1.0%
domestic worker 7,082 1,726,877 8.8% 1,773 1,511,509 7.6% 8,409 399,261 8.2%
student 13,569 3,137,917 16.1% 4,124 3,506,707 17.5% 16,043 773,178 15.9%
none 17,429 4,627,783 23.7% 4,552 4,003,569 20.0% 12,566 590,675 12.2%
incomplete primary 17,222 4,258,664 21.8% 4,867 4,164,771 20.8% 33,284 1,568,430 32.4%
primary 13,683 3,253,280 16.7% 4,163 3,558,635 17.8% 18,280 876,177 18.1%
secondary 25,370 5,514,262 28.2% 7,237 5,912,308 29.5% 27,221 1,341,608 27.7%
tertiary 17,701 1,880,630 9.6% 3,715 2,372,420 11.9% 9,305 471,270 9.7%



























169,665 38,094,385 100% 46,861 43,715,466 100%
Mode Share
bus - capital 23,808 5,644,866 14.8% 6,672 5,494,837 12.6% 25,391 2,920,189 22.4%
bus - other cities 4,937 2,140,540 5.6% 1,812 2,622,634 6.0%
bus - metropolitan 2,730 1,248,668 3.3% 550 1,265,811 2.9%
subway 12,753 2,223,397 5.8% 4,392 3,218,989 7.4% 1,846 206,259 1.6%
train 2,471 815,177 2.1% 933 1,141,140 2.6%
school bus 5,098 1,326,602 3.5% 1,950 2,011,132 4.6% 9,113 679,912 5.2%
charter bus 1,484 513,591 1.3% 313 389,427 0.9%0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0%
driving 44,584 7,276,263 19.1% 10,121 8,644,290 19.8% 26,063 2,278,429 17.4%
passenger 16,804 3,105,088 8.2% 4,077 3,706,649 8.5% 12,374 1,068,235 8.2%
taxi 1,149 90,686 0.2% 220 135,156 0.3% 894 87,530 0.7%
moto 2,582 721,156 1.9% 998 1,038,960 2.4% 6,476 547,185 4.2%0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0%
walk 49,715 12,623,047 33.1% 14,504 13,708,189 31.4% 52,353 4,809,512 36.8%
bike 1,354 303,828 0.8% 252 267,788 0.6% 1,783 129,764 1.0%
other 196 61,475 0.2% 67 70,463 0.2% 4,247 332,703 2.5%
Trip Motivation
b
work 41,209 9,260,825 44.6% 12,066 11,168,873 46.2% 31,398 2,871,669 40.7%
education 27,589 6,894,413 33.2% 7,762 7,364,866 30.5% 20,676 1,859,108 26.3%
shopping 4,652 799,410 3.8% 1,106 1,057,847 4.4% 3,679 348,539 4.9%
leisure 5,419 882,036 4.2% 1,107 973,142 4.0% 4,759 460,154 6.5%
other 15,579 2,946,686 14.2% 4,022 3,588,715 14.9% 5,586 606,156 8.6%
Notes:    a  shares are based on the number of observations multiplied by population weights  
Notes:    b  excluding return trips to home























short distance 43,815 11,181,967 88.6%
expensive fare 2,218 635,216 5.0%
transit stop is far 515 139,876 1.1%
transit takes time at origin 447 103,078 0.8%
transit trip is too long 78 11,981 0.1%
transit is crowded 148 31,787 0.3%
physical activity 1,336 255,854 2.0%
other 1,158 263,289 2.1%
53,281 13,912,842 100%
self-paid 22,833 5,341,783 38.4%
employer 18,394 5,532,548 39.8%
exempt 4,516 1,019,105 7.3%
other 501 151,012 1.1%




























































































Figure C.7: RD Results for Travel Behavior Changes, Women from São Paulo 
 
 
 
 
